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PREFACE
The objectives of this thesis are to (1) prove the possible compatibility of
reason and pathos1, and, (2) the necessary means to strengthen the emotionalstates of the mind using rhetorical spoken discourse2. These objectives are
undeniably controversial; and they were dealt with over a long history of
thought. In the light of these developments, this research does not argue
about the validity or invalidity of concepts, but it intends to open possibilities
for further studies.
Why rhetorical spoken discourse? Whether deliberately or nondeliberately, we practice the tekhnē of rhetoric in various forms, occasions and
realms, be it educational, be it social, be it political, be it religious, along with
others. As human beings, we unceasingly communicate with our respective
contexts. During this communication process, either we argue different
opinions and ideas, or we defend one opinion against the other. And, in a
considerable number of occasions, we try to influence and persuade the other
party(ies), engaged in the communication process, with a particular point of
view or perspective.
Because there is, at all times, an objective or a goal is to be reached by
communicating, there ought to be a method and a systematic means through

1
2

The first objective is covered in Chapters 1 to 4 in this research.
The second objective is covered in Chapters 5 to 8 in this research.
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which the goal could be achieved. Otherwise, the objective of communication
would be void and no end would be attained. This implies a very dynamic
cultural3 context of diverse human interactions, situations, timings,
knowledges, empirical values, judgements in addition to a vast amount of
presentation and reception of particular intellectual and cognitive powers.
Pathos on the other hand plays a distinct role in our everyday
experiences. Sometimes it motivates our behavioral responses and our
actions, sometimes demotivates them. It is also interpretive during our
communications4. This means that when persuasion5 is sought, there ought to
be a method through which these emotions could be generated by a rhētōr.
Creating a state of an emotional impact as such can be irrational and can also
be momentary. In other words, it could be built on invalid opinions or ideas;

Cultural in this research refers to the man-made environment, including government
structures, political conditions, sociological conditions and psychological conditions among
others. In addition, Prinz, in his article on Culture and Cognitive Science, argues that the
cultural environment has a critical intellectual effect on the moral values and the emotions of
the society. On emotions, he explains that: “Culture can clearly influence what arouses our
emotions … In addition, cultures can promote highly complex behavioral responses … For
those who take emotions to essentially involve judgments … theories of emotion are
attractive, because culture can influence how people construe situations … Emotions are
analogous to scripts, which include everything from canonical eliciting to conditions to
complex behavioral sequalae … the evidence suggests that culture can influence every aspect
of our emotional responses, and this suggests that, whatever emotions really are, culture can
have an impact”. And on moral values, Prinz argues that: “Morality is also influenced by
culture … Appeals to cultural history adequately explain why we have moral values” (Prinz
2011).
4 For example: when a speaker uses either linguistic terms or facial expressions which imply
anger or happiness (during a discourse), these terms become the interpretation means
through which the listeners could conceive/understand better the intentions of the speaker.
5 Persuasion can be for arguing different opinions and ideas, conveying knowledge and
information, influencing a change in behavior or motivating for a particular action.
3
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and it could be of short-term impact, which ends as soon as a spoken
discourse is over. This implies that reason – in case of seeking rational and
long-term outcomes – is indispensable. Why? Reasoning pathos contains more
than one state of the mind, for instance: the intellectual state of the mind (for
understanding), the judging state of the mind (for motivating a decision for
change or action), in addition to the emotional state of the mind (for
applying/employing the particular change or particular action). The
interconnectedness of the three states can exert a sustained state of
persuasion. This continued state of association can therefore increase the
adherence level of the listeners to the discourse and as a result can lead to a
state of change and accordingly a state of action.
Considering the reasons explained above, after thoroughly reviewing
the available literature on reasoning pathos for spoken discourse, I found that the
available texts essentially attempt to either prove or disprove an individual
theory of spoken discourse. In a few cases, the text highlights a further
developed thought or a trend emerging on the topic. As a result, the need to
work on a systematic research on reasoning pathos for spoken discourse came
into my mind.
Hence, for the purpose of better presenting the two objectives of this
study, it is necessary to first lay down the connotations of the associated

10

theories, concepts and terms that constitute the core of this thesis. This
enables us to cognize the level of influence caused by every interacting
element on the other.
The topic of this thesis, “Rhetoric: Spoken Discourse, a systematic
appeal for reasoning pathos”, has four components. These are (1) the cultural
context that evokes an urge for a persuasive development of thought, (2) the
qualifications of the rhētōr, (3) the reasoning method (using ēthos, logos and
pathos), and (4) the listeners. Therefore, in all the theories discussed in this
research these four elements are considered. On the other hand, when seeking
objectivity, knowledge and truth, none of the constructs of this research
excludes reason. Without the capacity for reasoning, the world around us
would be meaningless. That is why the sequential argumentation is built with
an open-eye to reasoning.
The first objective of this research is to attain a rational state of
“possible” compatibility between reason and pathos at any particular time, place
and occasion for the tekhnē of rhetorical discourse. This attempt moves in a
systematic chain of theoretical developments. It articulates the methodology
to practice effectively this tekhnē. For the tekhnē to be effective, it has to
become persuasive. This implies that the research should first realize the
“possibility” of compatibility between reason and pathos (the first objective of
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the research) in order to explain further how they could be simultaneously
employed to allow for the potentiality of action-change (the second objective
of the research).
First Objective of the Research:
Standard texts assert that reason should exclude emotions; however,
emotions could, in certain circumstances, facilitate or enable rational decisions
and actions. On the other hand, reason relates to explicit or implicit facts,
premises, inferences and judgements. Hence, provoking reason using
emotional appeal could lead to the “need” to acquire knowledge, which
implies another “need” of exerting change in the human mind and thereby in
potential human action. Therefore, reason and emotional appeal are not
necessarily mutually exclusive.
In order to elaborate this possibility, the discussion of the first four
Chapters6 starts by defining the science and art of rhetoric. The main thoughts
of each Chapter are:
Chapter 1: Rhetorical discourse is an intended means to change
particular knowledge and to seek persuasion. This implies that we are dealing
with a purposeful7 science which not only requires a method for the tekhnē,

From Chapter 1 to Chapter 4 in this research.
Purposeful here refers to the objective of applying the spoken discourse. This objective is to
change (either add, assert or deny) the situational understanding of the status-quo of the
listeners in order to increment a potential change in behavior or action or both.
6
7
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but also attention to the particularity of occasion, kairos and as a result a form
of reasoning.
To preserve the good objectivity of any spoken discourse, the rhētōr
should speak knowledgably. Unless the speaker is acquainted with his topic, is
able to reason the categories of the constituents of this topic and is capable of
molding both in a manner that is balanced with the reception of his listeners,
this rhētōr would neither be objectively good nor attain the aim of his spoken
discourse. Hence, any proficient rhētōr must seek to possess/acquire the
necessary skills to accomplish his tekhnē.
Chapter 2: Plato and Aristotle founded the primary principles of the
art of spoken discourse. The first was influenced by the turbulent political
conditions of Athens during and after the Peloponnesian War. Thus, his
conceptions of the tekhnē were built upon rejection to the sophistic
manipulative discourses that deluded the people of Athens. Plato formed an
ideal perspective of spoken discourse (towards the end of Gorgias and in
Phaedrus). He asserted that if this tekhnē is to be used for the good of the
listeners, it must contain simultaneously: genuine knowledge and absolute
truth.
Aristotle’s conception of the rhetorical tekhnē was more
realistic/pragmatic. Being affected by his studies of dialectic and its
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methodology of refutation, he reformed the definition of the art. He neither
denied knowledge nor truth, but he added the attribute of particularity8 to
both. He allowed the listeners to use their faculty of judgement9 to assess the
truthfulness of the rhētōr. Furthermore, he asserts that to understand better
the tekhnē, we need to observe and analyze how the established practitioners
apply it.
Chapter 3: From the above Chapter, we can deduce that understanding
is a pre-requisite for observation and analyses. Understanding, however,
includes two simultaneous meanings: (1) realizing the art of understanding
and (2) understanding the art itself. Gadamer argues that hermeneutics10 can
assist us in attaining the two dimensions of understanding. According to him,
a rhetorical discourse is balanced only when the rhētōr acquires a preunderstanding of the particular good (i.e. knowledge and truth) in addition to
a pre-understanding of a particular “shared understanding”11 (i.e. knowledge
of the particular audience) of his listeners.

Particularity means here situational.
Aristotle allowed the listeners to use their faculty of judgement based on his perception that
the human kind is capable of using common sense in distinguishing the right from the wrong
in many cases. Common sense here means the majority of the listeners’ agreement or disagreement with any particular opinion.
10 Gadamer based his assumption on the historical interconnected association between
rhetoric and hermeneutics to elaborate the meanings and intentions of various spoken
discourses.
11 The “shared understanding” concept, according to Gadamer, is a tool established by the
rhētōr. The objective of this tool is to prepare the state of the mind of the audience to engage in
any spoken discourse from the start. In other words, in order for a rhētōr to synchronize the
8
9
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Therefore, the particular knowledge is, at this point, of critical
significance and meaning. According to Sosa, it is possible to acquire this
situational knowledge. Nevertheless, it is possible only when it encompasses:
(1) truth12, (2) a type of belief13, and (3) a complete justification14. Hence, a
rhētōr can transform the particular/situational knowledge of his listeners when
he satisfies these requirements.
Chapter 4: The direct implication from the above argument is that the
subject of the rhetorical spoken discourse – the rhētōr – can transfer his
situational knowledge to his audience through the object of the rhetorical
spoken discourse – i.e. his demonstration. However, unless the attributes of the
subject and the object of knowledge are similar, not only the transfer of
knowledge will be disrupted, but also the objective of the discourse will not
be attained. This, at the same time, means that there ought to be a method
through which we can transform an intellectual form of reasoning into a
tangible practical form of reasoning.

state of the mind of his listeners, he has to acquire the situational knowledge of the common
language, subject and expectations (among other features) of his listeners.
12 Truth in this context refers to the Correspondence Theory of Truth as explained in Section 3.3
in this research.
13 Belief in this context refers to “the attitude we have, roughly, whenever we take something
to be the case or regard it as true” as explained in Section 3.3 in this research.
14 Justification in this context refers to the “Public Justification Principle”; it is explained in
Section 3.3 in this research.
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According to Aristotle, the medium of the transformation of particular
knowledge is demonstration. Moreover, because the type of knowledge
defined in this context requires particularity, the demonstration, too, requires
particularity. However, it should still follow a logical15 form of reasoning and
structure. The rhetorical16 form of reasoning satisfies this requirement. It is a
logical form of argument, which permits the demonstration to use
enthymematic propositions. A significant characteristic of the enthymemes is
that they permit the structure of the statements to illustrate prior incidents,
references and common opinions17. Hence, rhetorical reasoning permits the
transfer of particular knowledge using (1) reason, and (2) endoxa.
The demonstration is presented to the listeners by three
complementing skills that any proficient rhētōr must acquire. These are (1)
ēthos, (2) logos, and (3) pathos. Each of the skills has its distinctive role in the
process of persuasion and thus in the potentiality of exerting change on the
status-quo of the listeners.

Logical reasoning here refers to a group of principles or rules being demonstrated validly
and in the order needed to elucidate the subject argued sufficiently. It is explained further in
Section 4.2 in this research.
16 According to Aristotle, the rhetorical form of reasoning does not aim at covering every
opinion and every subject; it is concerned with intended customized situations. In addition, it
ensures that the topic is validly proven and it allows the listeners to reason an abbreviated
mode of statements (i.e. the implicit statements).
17 Opinions according to standard texts refers to particular knowledge that is either “probably
certain” or “probably true”.
15
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Ēthos, according to the definitions of Aristotle, St. Augustine, Campbell
and Perelman, denotes the character, the credibility, or the trustworthiness of
the rhētōr. These attributes are manifested to the listeners only through the
speech. They also assert that a rhētōr cannot convey any of them unless they
are already embedded in his self. Otherwise, he will not be capable of
conferring genuine persuasion to his listeners. Hence, the particular knowledge
of the rhētōr can be transferred through the skill of ēthos. This, in addition,
implies that ēthos carries/transfers the characteristics of reason, goodness and,
as a result, truth.
According to the definitions18 followed in this research, logos is the
spoken words of the rhētōr. These spoken words include knowledge, truth,
apparent truth and endoxa. Logos is presented in the form of rhetorical
reasoning. Thus, its structure institutes reason and the common sense
association with the listeners to the discourse. It is a critical means that
corresponds to the rhētōr’s possible goodness and at the same time the good
knowledge of the tekhnē. Therefore, logos and ēthos simultaneously satisfy the
particular attributes of reason, goodness and truth.
Pathos is the third skill that any proficient rhētōr should acquire.
According to the discussed definitions19, the good rhētōr is the one capable of

18
19

The definitions of logos by Aristotle, St. Augustine, Campbell and Perelman.
The definitions of pathos by Aristotle, St. Augustine, Campbell and Perelman.
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motivating the good emotional state of his listeners (i.e. an emotional state that
accords with reason). The means of application of pathos convey the form of
reasoning of the rhētōr himself. In other words, when the rhētōr’s reasoning is
based on reason, knowledge and trustworthiness, the same characteristics are
embodied in pathos.
Consequently, we can deduce that ēthos, logos, and pathos are the
essential skills of any proficient rhētōr. Together they constitute the
body/speech of the rhetorical reasoning; and the author of the spoken
discourse establishes them. On the other hand, the subject and the object of
the discourse institute reason in the theoretical dimension and the practical
dimension of the discourse. They, furthermore, second an association of
attributes between the subject and the object (i.e. the particular goodness, the
particular knowledge, reason and common sense or shared understanding).
Thus, the spoken discourse is a means that permits the knowledge of the good to
be transformed by the good knowledge of the tekhnē. Furthermore, reason is a
requirement for establishing any form of rhetorical argument/demonstration.
Hence, reason and pathos are compatible in any particular spoken discourse.
Rhetorical discourse is, as a result, a purposeful critical tekhnē. It is
applied knowledgably and adapts to particular situations of speech in
accordance with the needs of the audience. In particular cases, the emotional

18

appeals could motivate a human decision for change or action which is based
on sound reasoning.
Second Objective of the Research:
The second objective of this research is to present and discuss a few
selected theories to weigh up the emotional appeal – pathos – using rhetorical
spoken discourse. They are purposefully selected to discuss (1) a theological
perspective, (2) a rational perspective, and (3) a social perspective.
To elaborate this, the following four Chapters20 start by defining the
faculties of the mind. Then the interconnected association between the faculty
of reason, the faculty of judgement and the faculty of emotions will be
developed. The meaningful emotional behaviors and their potential
institution in beliefs and actions are necessary. They elaborate further the
selected21 theories of developing pathos in spoken discourse. Thus, we need to
explain the faculties of the mind and the role of reasoning to impose change
on the states of the mind.
Chapter 5: Perler explains in The Faculties that the human mind can do
“things in virtue of its rational faculties”22. The “first principle of a

From Chapter 5 to Chapter 8 in this research.
The selected theories exemplifies a theological-based theory by St. Augustine (Chapter 6), a
rational-based theory by George Campbell (Chapter 7) and a social-based theory by Chaïm
Perelman (Chapter 8).
22 See Perler, Dominik. 2015. The Faculties. New York: Oxford University Press.
20
21
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comprehensive science of living beings”, Perler asserts, is the Aristotelian
account of the soul. This principle includes four distinct faculties of the mind,
namely: (1) the “nutritive faculty”, (2) “the perceptual faculty”, (3) “the
rational faculty”, and (4) “the locomotion faculty”. Through the history of
thought and until recently, the definition of the faculties of the mind always
denoted the capacity of the human mind to intelligibly interpret the world
around it and thus to react accordingly. This implies the interrelated activity
between the different faculties of the mind23 and the settings-in-context of any
human being. Recent theories of emotions like those explained by Kirman,
Livet and Teschl24 convey a corresponding line of reasoning between the
faculty of reason, the faculty of judgement and the faculty of emotions. They
assert that in particular occasions, the emotional-state of the mind enables the
reasoning-state and sound judgements-state. In other particular occasions also,
the emotional-state of the mind itself is an outcome of the capacities of
reasoning and judging. We can deduce from this that reinforcing pathos using
rhetorical spoken discourse is a potential asset for any proficient rhētōr.
This argument implies moreover that the emotional-state-interaction
with the other faculties of the mind could play a significant role in potentially

The different faculties of the mind include the faculty of reason, the faculty of desire, the
faculty of cognition and the faculty of emotions … among others.
24 See Kirman, Alan, Livet, Pierre and Teschl, Miriam. 2010. Rationality and Emotions.
Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society. Vol. 365, pp. 215-219.
23

20

instituting behaviors or beliefs of human beings. For example, a few Cognitive
Theories25 clarify that the emotion-process accounts for a potentially
reasonable association between the states of the mind. This process also
enforces an affirmative correlation between the particular stimulating occasion
and the individual’s self-attributes and empirical contexts. Therefore,
according to this perspective, the emotional-state of the mind refers to the
faculty of reason and the faculty of judgement in order to postulate any
potential change in meaningful reactions and accordingly the potential
change in meaningful actions. Thus, demonstrating rhetorical spoken
discourses, which deliberately escalate pathos, has a practical outcome and
has a potential for exerting change on the status-quo of the minds of its
listeners.
Chapter 6: St. Augustine of Hippo was a preacher and a philosopher
during the early Middle Ages. His theory of arrangement, style and delivery
is exemplary in inspiring pathos through religious discourse. He adopted
Cicero’s doctrine of rhetoric; however, he transformed the political discourse
of Cicero into the theological discourse. His main guidelines were preaching
using wisdom and truth in addition to attaining and sustaining an emotionalstate with the listeners to attain persuasion.

The Cognitive Theories here refer only to the Judgement Theory and the Cognitive
Appraisal Theory. They are explained and commented upon in Section 5.3 in this research.
25

21

Augustine’s conception of amplifying emotions employs eloquence. He
also associates the understanding of Scriptural conventional signs with the
faculty of reason. He asserts that the religious discourse affects the state of the
minds of the listeners when it is characterized by knowledge and simplicity.
He, furthermore, claims that using conventional signs is one of the tools to
transform Scriptural knowledge and this is for two reasons. The first is their
being already presented to us in the Scriptural texts. They cause a sort of
incomplete or distorted understanding of the genuine meaning and
implications provided through the texts); thus, when interpreting them (the
conventional signs) with eloquence, they not only affect our understanding of
the Biblical texts, they also affect our emotional state of the mind due to the
values of wisdom and truth they convey. The second reason is that
conventional signs contain in them intentions and implications that articulate
knowledge.
As a result, Augustine develops a theory of persuasion using
understanding (to correspond with the faculty of reason) and the
conventional signs (to correspond with the faculty of emotions). The theory
first argues that any Scriptural discourse must be presented in a hierarchical
order that allows reason to conceive the embedded illustrations sequentially.
Then, the proficient preacher should establish his argument in an
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inspirational style/approach to his listeners and simultaneously augment this
style with delivering the inferences, which correspond to the conventional
signs in the Scriptural texts. Unless these three features are sustained in the
religious discourse, not only the ambiguities in the Scriptural texts will
remain un-understood, but also it is almost impossible to persuade the
listeners. Hence, St. Augustine in developing his theory of arrangement, style
and delivery with the aid of conventional signs, he emphasizes a persuasive
means to transfer knowledge and wisdom using reason and the emotional appeal.
Chapter 7: George Campbell was a preacher, a lecturer of history and a
college principal. Following the call for rational persuasion on the states of the
mind formulated during the Enlightenment period, he established his theory
of invention and presentation to increase pathos. He was influenced by the
thoughts of Sir Bacon and his theories of the mind, which connect the state of
the mind to psychology.
Campbell asserts that when persuasion is sought, the rhetorical skills
are necessary. He argues that engaging the listeners in any discourse should
use various means in order to reach understanding. In addition, arousing the
faculty of emotion of the listeners is critical to convince their faculty of reason.
According to Campbell, appealing to the faculty of reason is for the sake of
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convincing; and, appealing to the faculty of emotion is for the sake of
persuasion. Therefore, he built up his theory on invention and presentations.
Campbell’s theory argues that invention aims at convincing the faculty
of the mind (using loci because it enhances the speech with evidences).
Invention, being so, is:
A proof consisting of an uninterrupted series of axioms. The truth of
each is intuitively perceived as we proceed. But this process is of
necessity gradual, and these axioms are all brought in succession. It
must, then, be solely by the aid of memory that they are capable of
producing conviction in the mind.26
On the other hand, he adds that presentations (using auditors and
descriptive language) aims at persuading the faculty of emotion. According to
Campbell, presentation is:
To inquire what these circumstances are which will make the ideas he
summons up in the imaginations of his hearers resemble, in lustre and
steadiness, those of sensation and remembrance; for the same
circumstances will infallibly make them resemble also in their effects;
that is, in the influence they will have upon the passions and affections
of the heart.27
Campbell, furthermore, states that it is very rare that rational passions
come alone; they are mostly associated with reason. Hence, for developing his
theory of invention and presentation, Campbell emphasizes that the only

See Campbell, George. 1868. The Philosophy of Rhetoric. New York: Harpers & Brothers
Publishers.
27 See Campbell, George. 1868. The Philosophy of Rhetoric. New York: Harpers & Brothers
Publishers.
26

24

means to attain conviction is by appealing to reason; and the only means to
attain persuasion is by appealing to emotions. Thus, none of them could be
reached without the other. He sums up his thoughts by stating that “all the
ends of speaking are reducible to four; every speech is intended to enlighten
the understanding, to please the imagination, to move the passions, or to
influence the will” (Campbell 1868, 23).
Chapter 8: Chaïm Perelman was a lecturer of history with vigorous
understanding of law and the role of logic and rhetoric in legal arbitrations.
His awareness of the need of allowing argumentation to meet the practical
and the actual state of existence of human beings made him insist on forming
a reasonable theory of rhetoric that enables reason and emotions to reconcile.
He, therefore, established his theory of amplification to provoke pathos.
The objective of his theory is to intensify the emotional state of the
listeners by establishing a communion of values. He explains the concept of
communion by arguing that when a rhētōr seeks a persuasive discourse, he
should establish a state of unity between his listeners and himself. This state
of communion is accomplished by the rhētōr only when he secures28 a shared

Perelman argues, “Securing an agreement on … certain points is hence an objective which
will determine the order to be followed in argumentation. A speech is not exclusively built up
by developing the original premises; it consists also of establishing premises and of making
agreements unambiguous and stable … These agreements sometimes are the result of the
attitude of the parties, and sometimes they are institutionalized by virtue of established
custom or the existence of explicit rules of procedure” (The New Rhetoric: A Treatise on
Argumentation 1969, 110).
28
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understanding with his listeners in order to adhere29 to the minds of the
universal audience. According to Perelman, examples of means for
establishing communion are (1) particular values, and (2) abstract values.
Both are tools to appeal to the emotions of the particular listeners. Particular
values amplify abstract emotional states – like the state of emotion of
behaviors towards ones’ country; and abstract values amplify concrete states
of emotion – like the state of emotion of faith and loyalty.
Universal30 audience, Perelman, argues is an invention by the rhētōr.
The role of this invention is to probe the appropriate values that appeal to the
emotions of the particular audience. He elaborates that the universal audience
“pass judgment”. In other words, the universal audience appeals to reason
(i.e. they validate concepts).

Mind adherence, according to Perelman, denotes: “adherence of the minds is its variable
intensity: nothing constraints us to limit our study to a particular degree of adherence
characterized by self-evidence, and nothing permits us to consider a priori the degrees of
adherence to a thesis as proportional to its probability and to identify self-evidence with
truth” (The New Rhetoric: A Treatise on Argumentation 1969, 4).
30 Perelman uses in this context the Aristotelian concept, which argues that the form of
reasoning (in case of necessities and probabilities) that applies on categorical subjects (i.e.
universals) applies as well on their derived subjects (i.e. particulars). Hence, according to
Perelman the “audiences are not independent of one another, that particular concrete
audiences are capable of validating a concept of the universal audience which characterizes
them … it is the undefined universal audience that is invoked to pass judgement on what is
the concept of universal audience appropriate to such a concrete audience, to examine
simultaneously the manner in which it was composed, which are the individuals who
comprise it, according to the adopted criterion, and whether this criterion is legitimate. It can
be said that audiences pass judgement on one another” (The New Rhetoric: A Treatise on
Argumentation 1969, 35).
29
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Perelman sums up his thoughts by asserting that:
All language is the language of a community, be this a community
bound by biological ties, or by the practice of a common discipline or
technique. The terms used, their meaning, their definition, can only be
understood in the context of the habits, ways of thought, methods,
external circumstances, and traditions known to the users of those
terms.31
Hence, he provides us with a reasonable conception of argumentation
involving persuasion. This persuasion cannot be functional unless it employs
simultaneously the faculty of reason to appeal to the faculty of emotions of
the listeners.
Chapter 9: finally, the conclusion summarizes the main reflections on
the attempt to justify reasonably the two objectives of this thesis. It is
augmented by a final note on the mutual affiliation of reason and pathos in any
rhetorical spoken discourse.
It is worth noting that the Chapters of this thesis include a deduced
interpretation and a commentary on each theory and concept. These
reflections are constructed only upon the theories, concepts and texts
illustrated herewith. Hence, the research presented hereby is an attempt to
reflect, in a logical sequence, the objectives of this thesis in a comprehensive
and coherent manner.

See Chaïm Perelman and Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca. 1969. The New Rhetoric: A Treatise on
Argumentation. Translated by J. Wilkinson and P. Weaver. Notre Dame: University of Notre
Dame Press.
31
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CHAPTER 1 – Introduction
1.1

Defining Rhetoric
Rhetoric32, the skill (tekhnē33) of persuasion: a universal art in the sense

that it is resourcefully applied to any particular topic and at any particular
occasion (Rapp 2010). The tekhnē is provided through spoken discourse and
written discourse. The ergon34 of this tekhnē is typically to provoke the states
of the mind of the listeners at any particular time. Its outcome is to change (i.e.
either add, assert or deny) the “situational”35 understanding of the status quo
of listeners. Hence, it ought to increment the potentiality of exerting change.

“Rhetoric is defined as the ability to see what is possibly persuasive in every given case
(Rhet. I.2, 1355b26f.). This is not to say that the rhetorician will be able to convince under all
circumstances. Rather he is in a situation similar to that of the physician: the latter has a
complete grasp of his art only if he neglects nothing that might heal his patient, though he is
not able to heal every patient” (Rapp 2010).
33 Thomas quotes best one of the contemporary descriptive explanations of the term “tekhnē”:
“The rhetorical practice of textual production and reception seen as tekhnē – as more than
simply the technical skill but the very art and craft of making the text” and “When you write,
you lay out a line of words. Lay one word and then another. Each must fit perfectly to its
neighbor, and do the job for which it has been selected. This is the work of the Laborer, and
an artisan: one committed to the search for perfection, one prepared to work very hard
indeed, one capable of infinite patience … This approach to writing is the work of a person
who can visualize the line in which the words are to be laid; one who can imagine how it
should appear when it is done. An architect perhaps. A person who designs, describes and
crafts the idea of an edifice that is capable of being transformed into something that will exist
in space and time” (Thomas 2007, 60).
34 Ergon, Höffe explains the term as Aristotle’s concept of the “function of man” using reason
or logos (Höffe 2010, 12).
35 Scenters-Zapico argues that the “situational” criteria for the rhetorical tekhnē is, not only to
consider the particularity of the occasion, but also to consider the particularity of the time and
place (i.e. kairos). He quotes “kairos came to mean that which is fitting in time, place, and
circumstance, which means the adaptation of the speech to the manifold variety of life, to the
psychology of the speakers and hearers” (Scenters-Zapico 1993, 362).
32
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Mason in his book on Philosophical Rhetoric: The Function of Indirection in
Philosophical Writing argues that "if any truth can be expressed in words, its
expression will have a rhetorical shape" (Mason 1989, 93). He explains
throughout his analysis that the aim of philosophy is to seek the truth. This
ambition could not be accomplished by the standard modes of speech;
however, the rhetorical discourse includes the means through which truth
could be conveyed to the listeners (in a manner that needs an amount of
“indirection”). By indirection, Mason, does not mean manipulation or any
negative connotations. By using the term “indirection”, he means an intended
“particular” method through which the truth could be elaborated upon to
expedite its comprehension by the listeners. Thus, for him, to transform any
possible knowledge implying truth, predominantly in a philosophical context,
requires a perpetual norm of forms of language, metaphors and analogy36 in
order to persuade the listeners with the subject matter (Mason 1989, 93-96).

Bartha in his article on "Analogy and Analogical Reasoning" in The Stanford Encyclopedia of
Philosophy explains: “An analogy is a comparison between two objects, or systems of objects,
that highlights respects in which they are thought to be similar. Analogical reasoning is any
type of thinking that relies upon an analogy. An analogical argument is an explicit
representation of a form of analogical reasoning that cites accepted similarities between two
systems to support the conclusion that some further similarity exists … such arguments
belong in the category of inductive reasoning, since their conclusions do not follow with
certainty but are only supported with varying degrees of strength … ‘inductive reasoning’ is
used in a broad sense that includes all inferential processes that “expand knowledge in the
face of uncertainty”” (Bartha 2013).
36
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Thus, rhetoric is a purposeful means and a critical tool to
knowledgably adapt to particular situations of speech37 in accordance with the
needs of the listeners. Its tekhnē uses a method or a technique of application
that could motivate rational human decisions for action.
1.2

The Rhetorical Tekhnē: a tool with an ergon
At this stage, it is significant to highlight a critical declaration. Any

applied tekhnē could be used either for good-reasons or for ill reasons. Such
probability exists not only for the rhetorical tekhnē, but also for any other
craft by human beings.
Along the history of philosophy and up to the most recent texts, there
have been interpretations of rhetorical practices to prove both applications. To
illustrate the opposing usages of the art, Kennedy explains:
The debate over the role of rhetoric in society has existed ever since,
and there are still people today for whom the word “rhetoric” means
empty words, misleading arguments, and appeal to base emotions.
There are dangers in rhetoric—political extremism, racism, and
unscrupulous sales techniques, for example—but by studying rhetoric
we can become alert to its potential for misuse and learn to recognize
when a speaker is seeking to manipulate us. There is great positive
power in rhetoric as well, which we can use for valid ends. The
American Founding Fathers organized public opinion in the cause of
American independence by use of the logical, ethical, and emotional
“Rhetorical” speech in this context refers to “Logos”. Graham states a basic philosophical
definition: “By the fourth century BCE logos is established not only as speech and the like,
but as the faculty of reason. Speech becomes the manifestation of reason, and reason the
source of speech . . . understanding of rhetoric presupposes a knowledge of souls—what
would later be called psychology—and the use of dialectic to implant truth in souls
(Phaedrus) . . . Thus speech becomes a model for thought, and ultimately a representation
for the world” (Graham 2006).
37
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power of rhetoric. Rhetoric has helped black leaders, women, and
minority groups begin to secure their rights in society. It has also been
an essential feature in the preaching and teaching of the world’s
religions, in the transmission of cultural values, and in the judicial
process.38
Kennedy’s empirical examples of the outcomes of the good-use and the
ill-use of the rhetorical tekhnē infers and assures that, along the time line of
history, such an art certainly affected the rise as well as the decline of cultures
and societies in diverse magnitudes.
This, consequently, directs us to an inquiry. If this tool is operative in
exerting change on the state of the mind of its listeners, then what are the
requirements that are necessary to make it a tool of “good” objectivity?
The tekhnē of persuasion has two main anchors: the rhētōr39, the
subject, and the receptive listeners, the object. For the rhētōr to produce the
outcome of this tekhnē, according to standard texts, he has to rationally
acquire three40 abilities, namely: (1) ēthos, (2) logos, and, (3) pathos. Any
imbalance in these three concurrent abilities causes instability in the process
of persuasion; and, this imbalance could as a result disrupt the objective of the
rhetorical experience, be it educational, political, religious or social.

See Kennedy 2007, x.
Rhētōr is derived from the Greek noun rhētorikē. In standard texts, it is exchanged with
either “orator” or “teacher of rhetoric”. In the introduction of On Rhetoric by Kennedy, he
interprets the term as the person who gives public speeches in assemblies or in the courts of
law. The term rhētorikē appeared, for the first time in texts, in Plato’s Gorgias (Kennedy 2007,
8-9).
40 The three rational abilities of the rhētōr are discussed in details in Chapter 4 of this research.
38
39

31

If the rhētōr, is the artist and is the one in charge of guiding the subject
matter (i.e. illustrating his thoughts in the form of a spoken discourse), then,
he ought to possess fundamental qualities in order to be able to convey his
message across – either for “good” objectives or for “ill” objectives. On the
other hand, if the assumption taken into consideration in this research is the
“good” objectivity of: (1) the message, (2) the rhētōr and (2) the tekhnē, then,
what are the necessary requirements for this tool to be objectively “good”?
Socrates, as documented by Plato, was the first to give us a recognized
roadmap with a description for the “good”41 objectivity of the composer (i.e.
the rhētōr) of a rhetorical speech. He argues that a speech could not be
considered “good” unless he, who speaks, speaks knowledgeably42. Socrates
explains that in order to speak knowledgeably, the speaker should know the
essence of his topic. He should be able to break this topic into its original and

As quoted by Kennedy, “Until someone knows the truth of each thing about which he
speaks or writes and is able to define everything in its own genus, and having defined it
knows how to break the genus down into species and subspecies to the point of invisibility,
discerning the nature of the soul in accordance with the same method, while discovering the
logical category which fits with each nature, and until in a similar way he composes and
adorns speech to a variegated soul and simple speech to a simple soul – not until then will it
be possible for speech to exist in an artistic form in so far as the nature of speech is capable of
such treatment, neither for instruction nor for persuasion” (Kennedy 2007, 14-15).
42 Sosa, in his article of the Two Conceptions of Knowledge, asserts that defining knowledge is a
demanding inquiry, not because of the scarcity of information or evidences, but due the very
numerous injected and developed theories that are attempting to re-define knowledge;
however, after his comparative propositional investigation of the theory of knowledge, he
states that: “in giving an account of knowledge it is surely correct to make allowance for a
metaphysical element (truth), a psychological element (something like belief), and a “unique”
epistemological element (warrant … or complete justification)” (Sosa 1970, 59-63).
41
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most truthful constituents and sub-constituents; he should also be able to
categorize reasonably the constituents – each in its most convenient time and
place in the speech – and in a manner that is in balance with the reception of
his listeners (Kennedy 2007, 14-15).
The account illustrated by Socrates implies that the “good” rhētōr, who
seeks a “good” outcome of his tekhnē, is the one who is capable of molding
any particular topic into his logoi43 knowledgeably, straightforwardly and in
coherence with the cognitive receptive capabilities of his listeners. According
to Socrates, this is the exclusive44 means through which any rhētōr could use
the art of rhetorical spoken discourse to influence the state of the mind of his
listeners for “good” purposes.
From the above, we can deduce that we have three
components/elements involved in the process of an applied rhetorical tekhnē:
(1) the particular “good” knowledge that needs to be addressed by the
rhētōr’s spoken discourse to his listeners, (2) the skills of the rhētōr, and, (3)
the state of the mind of his listeners. Hence, in order to cognize how the
emotional appeal could possibly be rationally suited to any of the three

Logoi: plural of logos.
“Will not the orator, artist and good man that he is, look to justice and temperance? And
will he not apply his words to the souls of those to whom he speaks, and his actions too …
will he not do it with his mind always on this purpose: how justice may come into being in
the souls of the citizens and how injustice may be removed, and how temperance maybe
energized and intemperance removed, and every other virtue be brought in and vice depart?”
(Gorgias (504e)).
43
44

33

components, we need to develop the foundation and the capacities of
reasoning for each in the following Chapters of this research.
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CHAPTER 2 – Critical Philosophical Views on Rhetoric
2.1

Cultural Background
The fifth and fourth century BCE – documented in the standard texts

on rhetoric – introduced a reformation of the traditional concept of rhetoric
through Plato, the student of Socrates. The Socratic character and the
implications provided in Plato’s dialogues shed the light on the past
applications of rhetoric (i.e. the sophists’ handbooks)45 – through the eyes of
Plato – and the current applications of rhetoric (at the time Plato wrote his
dialogues).
The political situation, which Athens was witnessing at that time, had a
strong impact on Plato’s framework of rhetoric. Athens witnessed political
disorders during and after the Peloponnesian War. Corruption was rife. The
fraudulent rulers executed Plato’s teacher, Socrates. The state conditions
permitted a certain type of rhetoric to prevail, either at the courts or at the
assemblies to convey the authorities’ message to the polis. Plato’s elementary
perception of rhetoric was undeniably affected by the political circumstances,
at later stages in his writings. He augmented his definition of rhetoric to a less
looked-down-upon classification46.

See Kennedy, George A. 1959. “The Earliest Rhetorical Handbooks”. The American Journal of
Philology, 80, no. 2: 169 – 178.
46 Plato’s augmented definition of rhetoric is elaborated in Section 1.2 in this research.
45
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On the other side, Aristotle, the student of Plato, who is viewed in
many of the standard texts as the “father of rhetoric”, endorsed a systematic
characterization of rhetoric to include a practical philosophy perspective. His
perspective was greatly affected by his education (both scholarly education
and the Platonic education). His conception of rhetoric expanded the
possibility for the rhetorical tekhnē in a methodological manner. Aristotle’s
approach in establishing the guidelines of the tekhnē, since then, has been
widely adopted and referred by philosophers and scholars of rhetoric.
2.2

Plato’s Socrates on Rhetoric
The conceptions portrayed in Plato’s Gorgias, for instance, at first gives

no definition or explanation of the term rhetoric. Kennedy asserts that Plato
rejects the mode in which rhetoric was practiced. The rejection is due to the
manipulative methods of applying rhetoric at that time. He explains his claim
with an argument led by Socrates in Gorgias, where Socrates describes the
practice of rhetoric as an art of flattery. Socrates deduced this characterization
when all answers given to him throughout the dialogue excluded any form of
genuine knowledge; and as a result, these same answers excluded truth.
Socrates expounds his argument by saying:
There are two different affairs to which I assign two different arts: the
one, which has to do with the soul, I call politics; the other, which
concerns the body, … which I can designate in two branches as
gymnastic and medicine … there is some intercommunication, as both
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deal with the same thing; at the same time they have certain differences
… their care for the best advantage respectively of the body and the
soul, are noticed by the art of flattery which, I do not say with
knowledge, but by speculation … Flattery, however, is what I call it,
and I say that this sort of thing is a disgrace … because it aims at the
pleasant and ignores the best; and I say it is not an art, but a habitude,
since it has no account to give of the real nature of the things it applies,
and so cannot tell the cause of any of them. I refuse to give the name of
art to anything that is irrational … But although, as I say, there is this
natural distinction between them, they are so nearly related that
sophists and orators are jumbled up as having the same field and
dealing with the same subjects, and neither can they tell what to make
of each other, nor the world at large what to make of them.47
The illustration above provides an image of how rhetoric was actually
practiced at that time. It was an ornament. One with which only external
matters were to be treated. Though its speakers mastered the skills of
persuasion, the demonstrations in spoken discourses excluded knowledge
and truth.
However, Plato, towards the end of the Gorgias and in his later
writings, restricted himself to an “ideal philosophical” definition of rhetoric
that was illustrated by Socrates. The restriction is exemplified in Plato’s
Phaedrus48 towards its end (277b5-c6)49. This ideal form establishes a universal

See Gorgias 464–466.
See Plato. Gorgias. 1871. Translated by Benjamin Jowett. New York: C. Scribner's Sons.
49 Kennedy quotes “Until someone knows the truth of each thing about which he speaks or
writes and is able to define everything in its own genus, and having defined it knows how to
break the genus down into species and subspecies to the point of invisibility, discerning the
nature of the soul in accordance with the same method, while discovering the logical category
which fits with each nature, and until in a similar way he composes and adorns speech to a
variegated soul and simple speech to a simple soul – not until then will it be possible for
47
48
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structure for the good rhetoric. The structure, on the other hand, allows a
clear classification that distinguishes the good rhetorical application from the
bad rhetorical application.
Plato’s conception argues that for the art of rhetoric to be good, it must
imply genuine knowledge and thus absolute truth for every element
embodied in the constituents of the art. The speech must as well be
transformed to the receptive listeners in the same form of genuineness and
clarity. (Kennedy 2007, 14-15).
Though the renewed argument of Plato is perceived as a starting point
of realizing a more “adaptable”50 version of defining rhetoric, in many of the
standard contemporary texts, it is understood to be a radical perception. The
universality of knowledge and the absoluteness of truth do not sound
attainable to the intellectual capacities of human beings.
From another perspective, if we consider the “broad” outcome or the
utmost objective of Plato’s “ideal51 philosophical rhetoric” definition, it surely
aims at the highest good, for the self and for the community. Indeed, it is
appreciated, but attaining it is a challenge that might come close to the state of
impossibility. This is considering the fact that the correct definition of

speech to exist in an artistic form in so far as the nature of speech is capable of such treatment,
neither for instruction nor for persuasion” (Kennedy 2007, 14-15).
50 Adaptable here refers to being moderately adjusted.
51 Ideal here implies the state of perfection that could be desirable, but unfeasible.
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“genuine”52 knowledge and “absolute”53 truth is subject of a debate that is
ever lasting and will probably remain so.
2.3

Aristotle on Rhetoric
According to Kennedy, Aristotle’s critical reception of rhetoric was

much less radical54. He adds that the study of dialectic equipped Aristotle to
form a pragmatic insight of rhetoric as a tekhnē due to the similarities that
exist between both (i.e. dialectic and rhetoric). Both arts, Aristotle argues are
applied to “particular” topics of knowledge. Both arts allow a methodology of
an argumentation or a refutation55 that could embrace presentations of
contradicting opinions in order to persuade the listeners (Kennedy 2007, 1517).
Arnhart in his book Aristotle on Political Reasoning explains that
Aristotle outlined the “good rhetoric”. Aristotle, according to Arnhart,
distinguishes the good art from the bad art by allowing an evaluation56 to be

Genuine means sincere authenticity.
Absolute in this context refers to total or complete perfection.
54 Kennedy states that Aristotle adapted “the principles of Plato’s philosophical rhetoric to
more realistic situations” where Aristotle “posits three modes of persuasion that are an
adaptation of Plato’s call for fitting the speech to the souls of the audience (1.2.3)” (Kennedy
2007, 15).
55 “One should be able to argue on either side of a question … not that we may actually do
both … but in order that it may not escape our notice what the real state of the case is and that
we ourselves may be able to refute if another person uses speech unjustly. None of the other
arts reasons in opposite directions; dialectic and rhetoric alone do this; for both are equally
concerned with opposites” (On Rhetoric 1355a12).
56 “Rhetoric is not an artless “knack” for persuading people; nor is it a collection of sophistical
devices using emotional appeals for distracting audiences or for deceiving them with
specious reasoning. Rather, it is a mode of argument, an art of reasoning that consists of
52
53
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carried on its outcome. The listeners of the rhetorical speech perform the
evaluation (Arnhart 1981, 34).
From the above, we can imply that Aristotle gave us a practical means
through which we can apprehend the art of rhetoric. He neither criticized the
art per se nor dismissed the knowledge and the truth embodied within it. He,
however, narrowed the universality of the knowledge. Aristotle consequently
narrowed the absoluteness of truth that are to be conveyed through a spoken
discourse. He asserts that:
Rhetoric is useful [first] because the true and the just are by nature
stronger than their opposites, so that of judgements are not made in the
right way [the true and the just] are necessarily defeated [by their
opposites] … Further, even if we were to have the most exact
knowledge, it would not be very easy for us in speaking to use it to
persuade [some audiences]. Speech based on knowledge is teaching,
but teaching is impossible [with some audiences]; rather it is necessary
for pisteis and speeches [as a whole] to be formed on the bases of
common [beliefs].57
In addition, for Aristotle, rhetoric is a tekhnē that could be used for
good reasons and could be used for bad reasons. The judgement of either
reasons depends on a natural existing evaluation skill in both: the rhētōr’s

“proofs” as conveyed through the enthymeme … Like many other beneficial instruments,
rhetoric can be harmful if misused. But the virtuous speaker can be trusted to apply it
properly, and the commonsense judgments of men as expressed in common opinion can be
depended upon in most cases to restrain the speaker who would misuse it” (Arnhart 1981,
34).
57 See On Rhetoric 1355a12.
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usage of the art per se and the common sense perception58 of the listeners (i.e.
in judging the right from the wrong).
Aristotle expands his conception of the rhetorical tekhnē by stating that
the art has two types of practitioners: (1) arbitrary practitioners, and, (2)
practitioners, who learned or acquired the necessary skills for the art. Thus, if
we observe how this tekhnē is applied (in practice) and if we analyze its
distinctive demonstrative proofs, we can understand the essential means
through which the tekhnē should be practiced and its form of reasoning (On
Rhetoric 1354a1-2).

As quoted by Arnhart from Aristotle’s Politics “But speech [logos] is for indicating the
expedient and the harmful, therefore also the just and the unjust; for this is the peculiarity of
men with respect to the other animals – that only men have perception of the good and the
bad, of the just and the unjust, and of other things; and it is the community in these things
that makes a household and a city. (1253a 15-18)” (Arnhart 1981, 5).
58
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CHAPTER 3 – The Foundations of Spoken Discourse
3.1

The Need for Interpretation
Hans-Georg Gadamer59 argues that hermeneutics60, as a philosophical

doctrine, expedites the process of understanding rhetoric. For Gadamer, to
understand the tekhnē of rhetoric, it is recommended to understand
simultaneously the tekhnē of understanding. The two tekhnē(s) according to
his account are sciences with boundaries61. Their interconnection could be
perceived systematically in their corresponding understanding.
Gadamer bases his claim on his understanding of the companionship
of hermeneutics and rhetoric. He describes this interconnected agreeableness
as “rhetoric … the art of articulating an understanding, while hermeneutics …

See Palmer, Richard E. 2007. The Gadamer Reader: A Bouquet of the Later Writings. Evanston,
Illinois: Northwestern University Press.
60 Ramberg and Gjesdal define the term in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy as
“hermeneutics covers both the first order art and the second order theory of understanding
and interpretation of linguistic and non-linguistic expressions. As a theory of interpretation,
the hermeneutic tradition stretches all the way back to ancient Greek philosophy. In the
course of the Middle Ages and the Renaissance, hermeneutics emerges as a crucial branch of
Biblical studies. Later on, it comes to include the study of ancient and classic cultures. With
the emergence of German romanticism and idealism the status of hermeneutics changes.
Hermeneutics turns philosophical. It is no longer conceived as a methodological or didactic
aid for other disciplines, but turns to the conditions of possibility for symbolic
communication as such. The question “How to read?” is replaced by the question, “How do
we communicate at all?” … Now hermeneutics is not only about symbolic communication. Its
area is even more fundamental: that of human life and existence as such. It is in this form, as
an interrogation into the deepest conditions for symbolic interaction and culture in general,
that hermeneutics has provided the critical horizon for many of the most intriguing
discussions of contemporary philosophy, both within an Anglo-American context and within
a more Continental discourse” (Ramberg and Gjesdal 2014).
61 Boundaries here refers to a set of limited usages/applications with specified techniques for
application (i.e. not universal).
59
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the art of understanding the articulation … each in a way presupposed the
other, since rhetoric presupposed understanding and understanding required
a persuasive articulation of the meaning of the text” (Palmer 2007, 227).
3.2

The Shared Understanding
How, then, does hermeneutics provide us with the guidelines to

comprehend the concept of “shared understanding”62 between the two
communicating sides of a rhetorical spoken discourse: the rhētōr and the
receptive listeners?
Gadamer in his Plato’s Dialectical Ethics argues that:
The ultimate possibility of arriving at a shared understanding depends
upon having in common a pre-understanding of the good. By going
back to the ultimate reason-giver, the thing for the sake of which
something exists, the later becomes understandable in its being, and
thus the agreement about it becomes attainable. All further agreement
is to be developed on the bases of this one. This pre-understanding of
what is sought, as that on the basis of which things are understandable
and thus as that on the basis of which justification is possible,
determines of the search itself.63
Thus, we can infer that when considering the state of a purposeful
rhetorical spoken discourse, which should attain its objective at any particular
occasion, the rhētōr, does not only need to provide a speech that is

Gadamer argues that by “shared understanding”, he does not mean the state of agreement
on the topic discussed between the two parties engaged in a conversation. However, he
means to “enable the participants themselves to become manifest to each other in speaking
about it … such a conversation is made no less fruitful by the participants’ inability to come
to an agreement about the matter, as long as it enables each of them to become explicitly
visible in his being to the other” (Gadamer 1991, 37).
63 See Gadamer 1991, 63.
62
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knowledgeably balanced, he also needs to establish a common64 ground for
“shared understanding” among his listeners. This state of “sharing” allows
the listeners to receive concurrently the demonstrations of the rhētōr. Without
this coexisting common ground for “shared understanding”, neither the
rhētōr nor the listeners would be at a well-adjusted state of connecting or
communicating together during the discourse.
On the other hand, the rhētōr should first acquire a common “preunderstanding of the good” in its variant forms in order to be able to establish
the “shared understanding” with his listeners. This instantly denotes that the
acquisition of knowledge per se is obligatory; and, in the case of the
“situational” application of the rhetorical discourse, the acquisition of the
“particular” knowledge of the good in the topic sought is non-dismissible.
Hence, proposing our spoken words, statements and demonstrations to
other human agents with the aim of allowing them to understand our

Vanderschraaf and Sillari in their article on Common Knowledge, Stanford Encyclopedia of
Philosophy, explains that “A proposition A is mutual knowledge among a set of agents if
each agent knows that A. Mutual knowledge by itself implies nothing about what, if any,
knowledge anyone attributes to anyone else” (Vanderschraaf and Sillari 2014). For example
(similar to the illustration by Vanderschraaf and Sillari), if an MA student is going to defend
his thesis. Then, the panel/judges and the audience at the defense room know that this is a
defense meeting and the student is going to defend his thesis. However, none of the
attendants in the defense room knows for fact that everyone else in the room knows this
statement. If it happens that one of the attendants say aloud (or openly) that the student is
coming to defend his thesis, then, each attendant knows that each attendant knows …etc. that
the student is coming to defend his thesis now. As a result, the statement initiated by one of
the attendants actually transformed the mutual known knowledge among the attendants
from a “mutual knowledge” to a “common knowledge”.
64
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discourse is a complex process. This presupposes synchronized time,
language and subject matter along with other factors that facilitate the
embodiment/demonstration process of an idea or a concept. In a rhetorical
spoken discourse, the presentations of a speech could not progress without
the establishment of the rhētōr-listeners’ “shared understanding”.
The inquiry that follows from the above argument is how could a
rhētōr acquire the “knowledge of the good”?
3.3

Knowledge of the good
Gadamer claims that the method through which the “knowledge” of

the good and the good “knowledge” of the tekhnē are attained by the listeners
is:
Only the individual is truly capable as a speaker who has
acknowledged as good and right the thing about which he is trying to
persuade people and is thereby able to stand up for it. This knowledge
of the good and this capability in the art of speaking does not mean a
universal knowledge of the “good”; rather, it means a knowledge
about that of which one has to persuade people here and now, a
knowledge of how one is to go about doing this, and a knowledge of
those whom one has to persuade. Only when one sees the
concretization required by the knowledge of the good does one
understand why the art of writing speeches plays such a role in the
broader argumentation.65
Nevertheless, knowledge theories are controversial. The term itself, (i.e.
knowledge), requires critical attention. In addition, an understanding of it

65

See Palmer 2007, 253.
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cannot be reached unless we satisfy two conditions. The first is to be able to
identify both: the subject – the knower – and the object – the known – of
knowledge. The second is to be able to identify the likeness or similarity in the
qualities or attributes of the subject and the object of knowledge in order to
intellectually comprehend the idea of knowledge and allow its possibility.
In rhetorical spoken discourse, the subject of knowledge is the rhētōr.
The object of knowledge is the topic of his speech. However, according to
Gadamer’s “shared understanding” criteria mentioned in the prior section,
the object of knowledge that needs to be attended to by the rhētōr is extended
to include: (1) the topic/subject of the rhētōr’s speech, together with, (2) his
establishment of a shared understanding with his listeners while
demonstrating the topic/subject.
In consequence, Sosa’s argument on knowledge as developed in the
article Two Conceptions of Knowledge 66 allows the possibility for “situational”
knowledge, and the requirements to satisfy this inquiry include: (1) truth67,

Two Conceptions of Knowledge: explained in the footnotes number 12, 13 and 14 in this
research.
67 Dowden and Swartz in their article Truth on the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy
illustrate that one of the major accounts of defining truth is “the most popular theory of truth
was the Correspondence Theory … this theory says truth is what propositions have by
corresponding to a way the world is … a proposition is true provided there exists a fact
corresponding to it. In other words, for any proposition p, p is true if and only if p
corresponds to a fact. The theory's answer to the question, "What is truth?" is that truth is a
certain relationship—the relationship that holds between a proposition and its corresponding
fact” (Dowden and Swartz 2015).
66
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(2) a type of belief68, and (3) a complete justification69 for the subject matter.
The direct implication inferred from this account is that the criteria Sosa states
for knowledge do not embrace “universal” knowledge. Therefore, the idea of
knowledge could be “situational” and should complement the time of the
discourse, the occasion of the discourse, the content of the discourse and the
particular listeners to the discourse.
If we could argue a “possible” similarity in attributes or qualities
between the subject – the rhētōr – and the object – the rhetorical spoken
discourse content – of the “situational” knowledge of the good, we could then
infer: (1) the possibility of knowledge within the tekhnē, and, consequently (2)
within the good knowledge of the tekhnē (i.e. through the skills of the rhētōr –
namely: ēthos, logos and pathos). Using a similar line of reasoning, we are
similarly able to deduce the “possible” compatibility of pathos and reasoning.
However, in order to be able to respond to this claim, we need to inquire

Belief as explained by Schwitzgebel in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy “refers to
the attitude we have, roughly, whenever we take something to be the case or regard it as true.
To believe something, in this sense, needn't involve actively reflecting on it … Many of the
things we believe, in the relevant sense, are quite mundane … Forming beliefs is thus one of
the most basic and important features of the mind, and the concept of belief plays a crucial
role in both philosophy of mind and epistemology… epistemology revolves around questions
about when and how our beliefs are justified or qualify as knowledge … Contemporary
philosophers characterize belief as a “propositional attitude”. Propositions are generally
taken to be whatever it is that sentences express … a propositional attitude, then, is the
mental state of having some attitude, stance, take, or opinion about a proposition or about the
potential state of affairs in which that proposition is true” (Schwitzgebel 2015).
69 Justification: see the Public Justification Principle provided by Vallier, Kevin and D'Agostino,
Fred. 2014. "Public Justification". The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2014
Edition), Edited by Edward N. Zalta.
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firstly into how each of the above elements are demonstrated – using reason –
in a rhetorical spoken discourse.
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CHAPTER 4 – The Demonstration: the good knowledge of the tekhnē
4.1

The Transformation
The objective of the transformation process is to convert a theoretical

conception into a practical one. In other words, we are to transform the theory
of spoken rhetorical discourse to the tekhnē of rhetorical spoken discourse.
However, the process should preserve – as much as possible – the attributes
of the concepts dealt with in order to avoid gaps in knowledge transfer,
meaning, and, as a result, gaps in understanding. These gaps could definitely
cause imbalance in the process of persuasion; and, the imbalance could
disrupt the objective of the rhetorical experience.
Hence, we need to transform the thinking-mode of the rhētōr into a
form that is conceivable and comprehendible by its listeners. The rhētōr
should portray his subject – the knowledge of the good – into a form of discourse
that is realizable by his listeners. In order to do so, he needs to use a medium
to conduct his object/topic. In the case of the rhetorical spoken discourse, the
medium through which this is done is “the demonstration”.
The significance of the demonstration is that it not only transfers a
theory to practice, it also transfers the abstract mode of thinking into a
tangible mode of illustrations. The newly reproduced presentations ought to
be understood by the listeners in order to allow the rhetorical spoken
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discourse to reach its outcome (i.e. the persuasion state, which increments the
potentiality of change or action). Kennedy, in his introduction to the
translation of On Rhetoric, asserts the need to the demonstrative medium and
its elements by saying:
The ideal rhetoric, intended primarily for one-to-one communication is
clearly highly unrealistic if applied to public address, where the
audience is made of a variety of “souls” with differing patience and
grasp of detailed argument. What Aristotle does in On Rhetoric is adapt
the principles of Plato’s philosophical rhetoric to more realistic
situations. A speaker, he says, should not seek to persuade the
audience of what is “debased”. He posits three modes of persuasion
that are an adaptation of Plato’s call for fitting the speech to the soul of
the audience. These become Aristotle’s ēthos, or projection of the
character of the speaker as trustworthy; pathos or consideration of the
emotions of the people in the audience; and logos, inductive and
deductive logical argument. He seeks to provide a speaker with a basis
for argument in “truth”: that is in knowledge of the proposition of
politics and ethics and of how to use this knowledge to construct
arguments.70
This implies that the rhētōr71 is now urged to transform the particular
knowledge72. Moreover, it is of utmost importance that the rhētōr acquires the
necessary skills and capabilities for the demonstration process to produce an
exposition, which does not alter the attribute of goodness and the attribute of
knowledge in them. Furthermore, the knowledge of the good is to be
demonstrated by the rhētōr to his listeners in the form of: (1) ēthos, (2) logos,

See Kennedy 2007, 15.
Rhētōr refers to the good rhētōr as discussed in chapter 1 in this research.
72 The particular good knowledge refers to the knowledge of the particular good or the
particular good topic.
70
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and (3) pathos concurrently. These three elements are the tools or the means
through which the rhētōr institutes his persuasive rhetorical spoken
discourse. Hence, the literature to follow will discuss transforming the
knowledge of the good through the good knowledge of the tekhnē.
4.2

The Form of Reasoning
According to the standard texts, the epistemic73 function is the form

through which knowledge is being presented to us. It ought to have the form
of reasoning. This form or structure is what allows our conception of any
science dealt with. The objective of any form of reasoning is to furnish our
intellectual capacities with the basic understanding of any particular
demonstration in a logical manner. Logical refers here to a group of principles
or rules being demonstrated validly74 in the order needed to elucidate the
subject argued sufficiently.
Aristotle in Posterior Analytics asserts that:
All instruction given or received by way of argument proceeds from
pre-existent knowledge. This becomes evident upon a survey of all the
species of such instruction. The mathematical sciences and all other

Epistemic function here refers to scientific information/knowledge (and in several texts it is
referred to as “genuine knowledge”).
74 Validity: the validity of the knowledge transformation process is critical in any scientific
argument for preserving the goodness and as a result the truth attributes in the transformed
knowledge.
73

51

speculative disciplines are acquired in this way, and so are the two
forms of dialectical reasoning, syllogistic75 and inductive76. 77
This means that for embodying any form of genuine knowledge, it is
necessary to constitute true propositions syllogistically.
But in the case of the rhetorical spoken discourse, the rigidity of the
standard logical arguments (implying the rules in its formation) could cause
inconvenience in the process of persuasion and consequently could negatively
influence the objective of the rhetorical discourse. This inconvenience is due
to three main reasons: (1) the particularity of the topic being illustrated for a
particular purpose, (2) the variance in the cognitive receptive capabilities of
the listeners, and, (3) the persuasion objective of the rhetorical spoken
discourse (which implies the potentiality of exerting change or action). These
factors inquire another form of malleable/flexible reasoning, while, at the same
time, keeping in mind the validity of the good knowledge and thus the truth.
Thus, Aristotle introduced another form of reasoning that neither
disrupts the validity of the argument nor the reasonableness of the
demonstration. It is the form of reasoning used in dialectic disputes 78. The

Syllogistic reasoning: “makes use of old knowledge to impart new, the syllogism assuming
an audience that accepts its premisses” (Posterior Analytics Book I).
76 Inductive reasoning: “makes use of old knowledge to impart new … induction exhibiting
the universal as implicit in the clearly known particular” (Posterior Analytics Book I).
77 See Posterior Analytics Book I, part I.
78 “The demonstrative premiss differs from the dialectical, because the demonstrative premiss
is the assertion of one of two contradictory statements (the demonstrator does not ask for his
premiss, but lays it down), whereas the dialectical premiss depends on the adversary's choice
75
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method of this reasoning is almost the same as the scientific reasoning. The
modification is only in the premisses. The premisses79 of the dialectical
argument could be formed in a manner that allows them to be agreed upon
implicitly among the arguing discussants and simultaneously allows these
implicit premisses to be deduced from “universal knowledge”80.
This implies that rhetorical81 reasoning is, still, a logical form of
argument (which follows reason). Its particularity is that it permits the
argument to use statement structures (i.e. propositions) that embrace
illustrations of prior incidents, references, common opinion 82 and
enthymemes83. Hence, the rhētōr is urged to identify the essence84 of the form of

between two contradictories. But this will make no difference to the production of a syllogism
in either case; for both the demonstrator and the dialectician argue syllogistically after stating
that something does or does not belong to something else” (Prior Analytics, Book I, Part 1).
79 “A premiss … is a sentence affirming or denying one thing of another. This is either
universal or particular or indefinite” (Prior Analytics Book I, Part 1).
80 “By universal I mean the statement that something belongs to all or none of something else;
by particular that it belongs to some or not to some or not to all” (Prior Analytics Book I, Part
1).
81 “The persuasion exerted by rhetorical arguments is in principle the same, since they use
either example, a kind of induction, or enthymeme, a form of syllogism … If our reasoning
aims at gaining credence and so is merely dialectical, it is obvious that we have only to see
that our inference is based on premisses as credible as possible” (Posterior Analytics Book I,
Part 19).
82 Opinion: according to standard text, an opinion is “probably certain” or “probably true”.
83 “The enthymeme is the sort of syllogism (and it is a function of dialectic, either as a whole
or one of its parts, to see about every syllogism equally) … for it belongs to the same capacity
both to see the true and what resembles the true” (On Rhetoric 1355a 11-12).
84 Essence here refers to the particular features of an element to facilitate its identification.
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rhetorical reasoning85 in order to be able to master it and consequently be able
to transform the knowledge of the good using the good knowledge of the tekhnē.
4.3

Rhetorical Reasoning: enthymemes
The tekhnē of establishing rhetorical reasoning demonstrations by using

enthymemes was introduced primarily by Aristotle; and, in the course of the
history of philosophy, it has been modified further in order to adapt to the
various contexts required by the necessities of political, religious, social or
educational purposes.
According to Aristotle, rhetorical reasoning is an artistic means of
persuasion. Its demonstration follows the same form of reasoning as
apodeixis86. Hence, it is composed of logically valid enthymemes87. In addition,
the apodeixis enthymemes are the strongest form of pistis88 of enthymemes.

Form here refers to the persuasive logical proof of an argument or a demonstration in a
rhetorical speech.
86 Apodeixis is the term that Aristotle uses for “scientific demonstrations” that are “logically
valid” (Kennedy 2007, 33).
87 “Since the persuasive is persuasive to someone (and is either immediately plausible and
believable in itself or seems to be shown by statements that are so), and since no art examines
the particular – for example, the art of medicine does not specify what is healthful for Socrates
or Callias but for persons of a certain sort (this is a matter of art, while particulars are limitless
and not knowable) – neither does rhetoric theorize about each opinion – what may seem so to
Socrates or Hippias – about what seems true to people of a certain sort … rhetoric [forms
enthymemes] from things customarily deliberated. Its function is concerned with the sort of
things we debate and for which we do not have [other] arts and among such listeners as are
not able to see many things all together or to reason from a distant starting point” (On
Rhetoric 1356b11–1357a12).
88 Pistis is a Greek term that refers to faith, belief or conviction. In addition, Kennedy explains
that “Pistis: has a number of different meanings in different contexts: “proof, means of
persuasion, belief” (Kennedy 2007, 31). It is worth noting that Aristotle differentiates between
artistic pistis and non-artistic pistis; in this research, we are concerned with Aristotle’s artistic
85
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The rhetorical syllogism – the enthymeme – is a logical form of
syllogism, but with a particular condition. Its premisses are deduced from an
opinion agreed upon by the majority of those who listen to a rhetorical
speech. When the listeners agree upon these premisses, they are at that
moment assumed to be true (endoxa)89. Aristotle asserts that as human beings
we have the capacity of apprehending both: the true opinion and an opinion
that resembles the truth (i.e. the apparent truth).
The reason for using rhetorical enthymemes is that during the course
of persuasion, we use logical proofs, which are propositions either directly
stated or induced. Because the rhetorical tekhnē does not aim at covering90
every opinion and every subject, it is more concerned with customized
situations that are intended (i.e. it is not randomly addressed). The ergon of a
rhetorical enthymeme is, as a result, to demonstrate its syllogistic form. This is

(entechnic) pistis, which he defines as: “the logical proofs that are prepared by methods and by
“us”” (On Rhetoric 1356a2).
89 Endoxa is the concept introduced by Aristotle to refer to an opinion that is assumed true
because it is shared (or held true) by the majority of the citizens or a particular population.
90 “We debate about things that seem capable of admitting two possibilities; for no one
debates things incapable of being different either in past or future or present, at least not if
they suppose that to be the case … It is possible to form syllogisms and draw inductive
conclusions either from previous arguments or from statements that are not reasoned out but
require a syllogism [if they are to be accepted] because they are not commonly believed; but
the former of these [i.e., a chain of syllogisms] is necessarily not easy to follow because of the
length [of the argument] and the latter is not persuasive because the premises are not agreed
to or commonly believed. Thus, it is necessary for an enthymeme … to be concerned with
things that are for the most part capable of being other than they are, the enthymeme
syllogistically and drawn from few premises and often less than those of the primary
syllogism; for if one of these is known, it does not have to be stated, since the hearer supplies
it” (On Rhetoric 1357a 12-13).
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done in order to ensure: (1) that the topic debated in a particular occasion is
validly proven, and, (2) that the convenience in its construction allows the
listeners to reason the covered topic from a “distant starting point”91. Thus,
we can infer that a skilled rhētōr, who can compose an enthymematic
demonstration, should also establish a true commonly shared opinion.
This means that since we are discussing an argument that is logically
proven and has the purpose of persuading the listeners of the topic of the
subject matter, then the syllogisms used are claiming two potential opinions
or possibilities. And, as agreed from the previous literature, the premisses
should follow (1) reason, and (2) endoxa.
However, if premisses are built on each other until we reach the
conclusion intended, the length of the argument would increase and thus the
listeners could lose track of the subject matter. Consequently, Aristotle
suggested that there should be fewer premisses. In addition, because the
subject covered by the rhētōr is building a group of his premisses on endoxa,
the listeners would be then capable of assuming the few omitted premisses
during the discourse.

Piazza in his article Pisteis in Comparison: Examples and Enthymemes in the Rhetoric to
Alexander and in Aristotle's Rhetoric explains: “the reasons for the success of brevity are
explained by referring to cognitive processes. Being brief and simple (and so avoiding both
unclearness and boredom) is a way to involve the listeners. To be more precise, it is a way of
letting the audience obtain an easy and quick learning” (Piazza 2011, 317).
91
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A question that follows from the above illustration is: if the body of
persuasion consists of probable subjects as well as endoxa and at the same time
it follows rhetorical reasoning, then how can we validate an opinion to be true
– as definitely both are not the same, (i.e. an opinion might be false)? Hence,
we are currently questioning probability and truth.
Aristotle’s further explanation provides us with a conceivable
argument. He states that rhetoric follows neither the strict scientific
demonstration nor the random opinion. In addition, though the rhetorical
enthymemes, which are sometimes directly spoken and at other times
implied, are derived from endoxa, there are still means to validate their truth –
as much as possible. The assumption that Aristotle gives is that, particularly
in the case of rhetoric, endoxa holds two probabilities: either true opinions or
partially true opinions. Hence, it is a science with its distinctive
characteristics. It follows neither the rigid necessary conditions of scientific
demonstrations nor the appeals or the appearances of the subjects (like the
sophistical rhetoric).
On the other hand, he asserts that the function of rhetoric is not to
address abstract or categorical subjects, but subjects that are derived from
those at particular occasions. The subjects are not selected at random. They are
also not infinite subjects. Furthermore, the form of reasoning (in case of
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necessities and probabilities) that applies to categorical subjects (i.e.
universals) applies as well to their derived subjects (i.e. particulars); and, the
same applies to their validity. Therefore, rhetorical enthymemes are
syllogistically valid and probably true in many cases92.
Hence, we can understand from the above that using the enthymematic
form of reasoning permits the possibility of preserving the particular goodness
in the knowledge, which is encapsulated in the discourse. It as well entitles
the rhētōr, who administers this demonstrative reason-defined method, to
formulate his rhetorical discourse when he masters the required good
knowledge of the tekhnē using: (1) ēthos, (2) logos, and (3) pathos. However, in
order to support this claim, we need to elaborate further on the features of the
three elements of the rhetorical form of reasoning ((1) ēthos, (2) logos, and (3)
pathos) in order to assert further the correspondence or concurrent potentiality
of attributes, namely: reason, goodness and as a result truth.

“Since few of the premises from which rhetorical syllogisms are formed are necessarily true
(most of the matters with which judgment and examination are concerned can be other than
they are; for people deliberate and examine what they are doing, and [human] actions are all
of this kind, and none of them [are], so to speak, necessary) and since things that happen for
the most part and are possible can only be reasoned on the basis of other such things, and
necessary actions [only] from necessities (and this is clear to us also from the Analytics), it is
evident that [the premises] from which enthymemes are spoken are sometimes necessarily
true but mostly true [only] for the most part. Moreover, enthymemes are derived from
probabilities … so it is necessary that each of these be the same as each [of the truth values
mentioned]; for a probability is what happens for the most part, not in a simple sense, as
some define it, but whatever, among things that can be other than they are, is so related to
that in regard to which it is probable as a universal is related to a particular” (On Rhetoric
1357a 14-15).
92
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4.4

The Skills: Ēthos, Logos and Pathos
Ēthos, logos and pathos are the three elements or appeals that any

proficient rhētōr should master. As explained above, the three skills are
interconnected and complementing to each other. Each of them has its
distinctive role in the process of persuasion and thus in the potentiality of
exerting change or action on the status-quo of the listeners. In order to realize
better the role of each skill in the rhetorical form of reasoning with their
respective characterizations, a few of the selected intellectual accounts are
illustrated in this section. They are collectively discussed and commented
upon.
Aristotle on ēthos:
[There is persuasion] through character whenever the speech is spoken
in such a way to make the speaker worthy of credence; for we believe
fair-minded people to a greater extent and more quickly [than we do
others], on all subjects in general and completely so in cases where
there is not exact knowledge but room for doubt. And this should
result from the speech, not from a previous opinion that the speaker is
a certain kind of person … Character is almost, so to speak, the most
authoritative form of persuasion.93
St. Augustine on ēthos:
A man who is resting upon faith, hope and love and who keeps a firm
hold of these, does not need the Scriptures except for the purpose of
instructing others … So that in their case, I think, the saying is already
fulfilled: “Whether there be prophecies, they shall fail; whether there
be tongues, they shall cease; whether there be knowledge, it shall

93

See On Rhetoric 1356a4
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vanish away”. Yet by means of these instruments (as they may be
called), so great an edifice of faith and love has been built up in them.94
These men … would do good to very many more if they lived as they
preach … What do you not do yourself what you bid me do? And thus
they cease to listen with submission to a man who does not listen to
himself, and in despising the preacher they learn to despise the word
that is preached.95
Campbell on ēthos:
As the soul is of heavenly extraction and the body of earthly, so the
sense of the discourse ought to have its source in the invariable nature
of truth and right; whereas the expression can derive its energy only
from the arbitrary conventions of men, sources as unlike, or, rather, as
widely different, as the breath of the Almighty and the dust of the
earth.96
Perelman on ēthos:
A speaker should inspire confidence: without it, his speech does not
merit credence … If the person of the speaker provides a context for the
speech, conversely the speech determines the opinion one will form of
the person.97
Ēthos thus denotes either the character, credibility or trustworthiness of
the rhētōr. Any of these attributes are manifested only through his particular
speech98 (i.e. not based on previous opinion).

See On Christian Doctrine Book I, Chapter 39.
See On Christian Doctrine Book IV, Chapter 27.
96 See Campbell 1868, 56.
97 See Perelman 1969, 318-319.
98 Speech here refers to the rhetorical reasoning form of speech as explained earlier in this
research.
94
95

60

The definitions found in the four diverse eras of the history of
philosophy (quoted above): the Classical99, the Middle Ages100, the
Enlightenment101 and the Contemporary102, assert that unless these attributes
are already embodied within the self-character of the rhētōr, he could not
possibly deliver the corresponding attributes in his speech – no matter how he
mastered the tekhnē per se. In other words, if the moral values of the rhētōr are
not as such, this particular rhētōr will not be capable to confer genuine
persuasion on his listeners.
Hence, we can say that if we agree on the possibility of the goodness of
the rhētōr (as argued in the earlier literature in this research), we can deduce
that the possibility of goodness is also manifested in the skill of ēthos.
Therefore, ēthos has the particular103 possible attributes of: reason, goodness
and, as a result, truth.
The second entechnic pistis provided in establishing a rhetorical form of
reasoning is logos.

The classical rhetoric was developed for a political intervention – as discussed earlier in this
research.
100 The Middle Ages rhetoric was developed for a theological intervention – will be covered at
a later chapter in this research.
101 The Enlightenment rhetoric was developed for a rational engagement intervention – will
be covered at a later chapter in this research.
102 The Contemporary rhetoric was developed for a social intervention – will be covered at a
later chapter in this research.
103 Particularity here refers to the non-universality of the attribute. It is concerned with the
particular occasion, particular kairos and the particular rhetorical subject.
99
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Aristotle on logos:
Persuasion occurs through the arguments [logoi] when we show the
truth or the apparent truth from whatever is persuasive in each case.104
St. Augustine on logos:
To speak eloquently, then, and wisely as well, is just to express truths
which it is expressed to teach in fit an proper words, --words which in
the subdued style are adequate, in the temperate, elegant, and in the
majestic, forcible. But the man who cannot speak both eloquently and
wisely should speak wisely without eloquence, rather than eloquently
without wisdom.105
Campbell on logos:
It is also a useful art. This is certainly the case, if the power of speech be
a useful faculty, as it professedly teaches us how to employ that faculty
with the greatest probability of success. Farther, if the logical art and
the ethical be useful, eloquence is useful, as it instructs us how these
arts must be applied for the conviction and persuasion of others. It is,
indeed, the grand art of communication, not of ideas only, but of
sentiments, passions, dispositions, and purposes. Nay, without this, the
greatest talents, even wisdom itself, lose much of their lustre, and still
more of their usefulness. The wise in heart, saith Solomon, shall be
called prudent, but the sweetness of the lips increaseth learning. By the
former, a man's own conduct may be well regulated, but the latter is
absolutely necessary for diffusing valuable knowledge, and enforcing
right rules of action upon others.106
Perelman on logos:
The goal of all argumentation, as we have said before, is to create or
increase the adherence of the minds to the theses presented for their
assent. An efficacious argument is one which succeeds in increasing
this intensity of adherence among those who hear it in such a way to
set in motion the intended action (a positive action or an abstention
See On Rhetoric 1356a-6.
See On Christian Doctrine Book IV, Chapter 28.
106 See Campbell 1868, 56.
104
105
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from action) or at least in creating in the hearers a willingness to act
which will appear at the right moment.107
We are going to apply here the term persuasive to argumentation that
only claims validity for a particular audience, and the term convincing
to argumentation that presumes to gain the adherence of every
rational being. The nuance involved is a delicate one and depends,
essentially, on the idea the speaker has formed on the incarnation of
reason.108
Logos, as exemplified above, is the particular argumentation
established by the rhētōr in order to persuade his listeners at a particular
occasion. It is spoken words, which encompass knowledge, truth, apparent
truth and common opinions. On the other hand, there is a broad consensus
(among the authors quoted above) that logos in order to produce persuasion
should follow the form of reason, conceivable language, clarity of ideas and
principles in addition to the common sense agreeability between the rhētōr
and his listeners.
Logos, though, has a unique feature among the three skills of a
proficient rhētōr. Ēthos and pathos are established using diverse styles of
rhetorical reasoning through his the skill of logos. This implies that if the
rhētōr fails to administer this skill, he would be certainly fail to reach the
persuasion state that is expected from his rhetorical discourse.
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See Perelman 1969, 318-319.
See Perelman 1969, 28.
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Therefore, we can deduce – so far – that logos re-asserts ēthos. Logos
furthermore corresponds to the possible goodness of the rhētōr and the good
knowledge of the tekhnē. Both concurrent skills carry the same attributes of
the rhētōr. Therefore, logos and ēthos simultaneously satisfy the particular109
attributes of: reason, goodness and as a result truth.
Pathos is the third concurrent skill that a rhētōr needs to acquire in
order to persuade his audience with the particular objective of his rhetorical
spoken discourse. The rhētōr makes the emotional appeal on his audience by
means of pathos.
Aristotle argues that in so far as we are human beings, the state of our
judgments could alter from one situation to the other. In other words, our
feelings could dismiss reason in a few occasions. However, he asserts that it
is the duty of the good rhētōr to motivate the good emotional110 state of his
listeners111.
St. Augustine on pathos:
Who speaks with the purpose of teaching … if he wishes to delight or
persuade his hearer ad well, he will not accomplish that end by
putting his thought in any shape no matter what, but for that purpose
the style of speaking is a matter of importance. And as the hearer must
Particularity here refers to the non-universality of the attribute. It is concerned with the
particular occasion, particular kairos and the particular rhetorical subject.
110 In Book 2, Kennedy explains, “Aristotle’s inclusion of emotion as a mode of persuasion,
despite his objections to the handbooks, is a recognition that among human beings judgment
is not entirely a rational act. There are morally valid emotions in every situation, and it is part
of the orator’s duty to clarify these in the minds of the audience”, (Kennedy 39).
111 The emotional states that accord with reason.
109
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be pleased in order to secure his attention, so he must be persuaded in
order to move him to action. And as he is pleased if you speak with
sweetness and elegance, so he is persuaded if he be drawn by your
promises, and awed by your threats; if he rejects what you condemn,
and embrace what you commend; if he grieve when you heap up
objects for grief, and rejoice when you point out an object for joy.112
Campbell on pathos:
Would we not only touch the heart, but win it entirely to co-operate
with our views, those affecting lineaments must be so interwoven with
our argument, as that, from the passion excited, our reasoning may
derive importance, and so be fitted for commanding attention; and by
the justness of the reasoning, the passion may be more deeply rooted
and enforced; and that thus both may be made to conspire in
effectuating that persuasion which is the end proposed. For here, if I
may adopt the schoolmen's language, we do not argue to gain barely
the assent of the understanding, but, which is infinitely more
important, the consent of the will.113
Perelman on pathos:
The argumentation … sets out to increase the intensity of adherence to
certain values, which might not be contested when considered on their
own but may nevertheless not prevail against other values that might
come into conflict with them. The speaker tries to establish a sense of
communion centered around particular values recognized by the
audience, and to this end he uses the whole range of means available
to the rhetorician for purposes of amplification and enhancement.114
The texts above show that pathos share a number of features in its
different formulations, but it differs115 in the mode of applying the emotional
appeal itself. Among the shared features is that pathos is a critical element in

See On Christian Doctrine Book IV, Chapter 12.
See Campbell 1868, 28.
114 See Perelman 1969, 28.
115 The differences between the mode of application of these emotional appeals will be
discussed – each – thoroughly in the coming chapters of this research.
112
113
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the persuasion process of any particular rhetorical discourse. Without
considering the emotional appeal in spoken discourses, (that are expected to
include different types of simple and complex reasoning forms), the
possibility that the listeners either lose interest in listening or lose focus in
following up with the argument increases. Thus, engaging the listeners’
emotions cannot be disregarded. Another shared feature is the capability of
the rhētōr to fathom the expected “common” or “shared” beliefs or notions.
These assumptions should allow him to represent in his logos the required
propositions based on which a potential emotional appeal of change or action
can happen. Also, without this attribute, the rhētōr would not be able to
establish a rhetorical discourse free from rejections or reversed judgements.
Pathos’ collective attribute (according to the quotes above) is that the
emotional appeal exerted by the rhētōr’s reasoning should comply with reason,
particularity of the situation and topic, knowledge, trustworthiness and clarity of
the shared/common understanding. This particular attribute is based on the
rhētōr’s reasoning in embodying his spoken discourse.
So, we can deduce – so far – that logos re-asserts ēthos and re-asserts
pathos. Thus, pathos corresponds to the possible attributes of goodness of the
rhētōr; and, it is embodied as well in the good knowledge of the tekhnē. The
three concurrent skills carry the same attributes of the rhētōr. Therefore, logos,
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ēthos and pathos simultaneously satisfy the particular116 attributes of reason,
goodness and truth.
Therefore, (1) ēthos, (2) logos, and (3) pathos are the elements that
constitute the body of the spoken rhetorical discourse. The three entechnic
pisteis are established by the author of the rhetorical spoken discourse (i.e. the
rhētōr). In addition, the subject and the object of the discourse follow reason in
the respective theoretical dimension and practical dimension. The manifested
similarity in the attributes of the subject and the object of the spoken
discourse have been discussed and deduced. Thus, the spoken rhetorical
discourse is a means that possibly allows the knowledge of the good to be
transformed by the good knowledge of the tekhnē. In addition, reason is a
requirement for establishing the rhetorical reasoning argument that institutes:
(1) ēthos, (2) logos, and (3) pathos. Hence, reason and pathos are possibly
compatible, particularly117.

Particularity here refers to the non-universality of the attribute. It is concerned with the
particular occasion, particular kairos and the particular rhetorical subject.
117 Particularity here means that the possible compatibility of reason and pathos is valid only for
particular occasions, particular kairos and particular rhetorical subject.
116
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CHAPTER 5 – Emotional Appeal in Spoken Discourse: pathos
No matter which context we individually exist in, communication
among us demands a common ground of understanding – including
emotional-states understanding. This applies to both simple contexts and
complex ones. Thus, having a common ground118 through which we
communicate our interaction process is a necessity for spoken and written
discourse. This objective of the common ground in a rhetorical spoken
discourse is to establish mutual bases of interests, values and ideas among
others.
As soon as we engage in any particular argument, it influences us and
it causes – in a way or another – a change in us. This change could be
intellectual only or intellectual and practical (i.e. involves action). In both
cases, any type of communication has an influence on us – even if minimal.
Gadamer asserts that:
The intention of the text, together with the psychological factors related
to the openness of the reader or listener to the text … is a process of
growing familiarity between the determine experience or the “text”,
and ourselves … We are continually shaping a common perspective
when we speak a common language and so are active in the
community of our experience of the world … Discussion bears fruit
when a common language is found. Then the participants part from
one another as changed beings. The individual perspectives with

The common ground here refers to shared concepts or principles with any context we exist
in (for example, language, images, metaphors, opinions …etc.).
118
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which they entered upon the discussion have been transformed, and so
they are transformed themselves.119
In his book Reason in the Age of Science120, he explains that as active
human beings we are in a continuous course of change and are impacted by
the psychological circumstances surrounding the diverse communications we
experience. When this change occurs, not only our perspectives’ change, but
we ourselves also change.
Hence, the second objective of this research being the modes or the
means of deliberating emotional appeal using rhetorical spoken discourse (i.e.
using rhetorical reasoning argumentation), we need to develop an
understanding of the process that occurs to produce the outcome of this
deliberation. It is, accordingly, essential that a skillful rhētōr realizes why and
how the change of emotional-states could potentially occur. This
understanding could undeniably make him better in carrying out his tekhnē.
5.1

Faculties of the Mind and Emotional-States
Perler explains in the introduction of The Faculties that the inquiry of

the co-relation between the activities exerted by a human being, which are
diverse and composite in some situations, and the human being per se is an
everlasting inquiry. Though different theorists and scientists, along history,

See Gadamer 1981, 110.
See Gadamer, Hans-Georg. c1981. Reason in the Age of Science. Translated by Frederick G.
Lawrence, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
119
120
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have been trying to resolve the multifaceted problems, no unified theory or
concept has yet been formed. Thus, it is a controversial inquiry. However, an
elementary consensus has been theoretically formed: the human mind, which
can exhibit all sorts of activities, has the capacity to do “things in virtue of its
rational faculties” (Perler 2015, 8).
Corcilius in the chapter of Faculties in Ancient Philosophy121 claims that
the ancient Greeks established the following conception:
We have a grasp of things not only by attending to what they actually
do or undergo at a given moment but also, and even more so, by
attending to their potential to either do or undergo things in the future,
that is, by attributing powers, abilities, and susceptibilities to them.
These powers, abilities, and susceptibilities are the dispositional
properties of the things around us. They are what these things either
can, or are reliable to, do or undergo.122
He argues that the claim developed by the ancient Greeks seemed too
abstract and did not match any concrete cognitive grasp of the world around
us. During his further investigations in the history of philosophy about the
first definitions of the faculties of the mind, he elaborated extensively on what
he named as “the first principle of a comprehensive science of living beings”.
It is the faculties of the soul, the Aristotelian account of the soul in De Anima
and its co-relation with the living body.

121
122

See Perler, Dominik. 2015. The Faculties. Oxford University Press.
See Perler 2015, 8.
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The principle explains that the soul and the body co-exist in life and
cannot dismiss one another. And in this unity, any human being performs
four123 basic activities that are governed by the soul. It is worth mentioning
that these abstract Aristotelian concepts of the soul, the co-existing
faculties/capacities and the living body have been examined and developed
by philosophers, theorists, psychologists and historians.
Among the developed conceptions, the soul was perceived as a
separate identity, where the capacities of the human mind that are to grasp
and comprehend reality need not include the soul. Other accounts included
theory of the mind and the evolution theory. A few others elaborated on the
abilities of the mind to intuit every perceived subject through a correspondent
capacity/faculty of the mind, one that is specialized in its particular
interpretation; for instance: the ability of the human being to see objects
correspond to a faculty of the mind for seeing, …etc. Also, a hierarchical order
of faculties has been elaborated, where there are capacities of different levels
of intelligible order (Perler 2015).

The four faculties of the soul are: (1) “the nutritive faculty … the capacity for selfpreservation”, (2) “the perceptual faculty … the capacity to take on perceptual forms without
their matter”, (3) “the rational faculty … the capacity to take on intelligible forms”, and (4) the
locomotion … involves a plurality of psychic and bodily factors (mainly perception, thought
and desire)”; “all other activities … such as desire, pleasure and pain, imagination, opinion,
and others, should in one way or another be derived from these basic subprinciples” (Perler
2015, 20-42).
123
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Yet, the original assumption stayed unchanged through the history of
research on the faculties of the mind. Faculties of the mind are the capacities
or the capabilities of the human being to intelligibly interpret the world he
exists in and thus to react accordingly. These faculties include reason, desire,
cognition, senses, and emotional-states124 … among others. This assumption
however indicates that the relation between the faculties of the mind and the
settings-in-context of any human being are interrelated.
5.2

Reason, Judgements and Emotional-States
The sequence of recently125 developed theories of the faculties of the

mind endorses the establishment of an intelligible connection between reason,
judgements and emotions. In their article Rationality and Emotions, Kirman,
Livet and Teschl remarkably illustrate a corresponding line of reasoning
between these three faculties/capacities. They explain that it is unfortunate
that along history the concepts of reason, judgements and emotions have been
– in a way or another – discussed in a negative sense, where both exclude
each other. Our existence is not mere black and white. On the contrary, the
developments witnessed by various sciences allow us to re-establish the

An emotional-state is a mental activity. It has the potentiality of both: producing behaviors
and/or producing actions. The emotional-state persistently needs a stimulus to alter its state.
The state could be internal (like, a memory) or external (like, being affected by external words
or actions), (Theories of Emotion. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy).
125 Particularly in Contemporary Philosophy.
124
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potential interconnectedness of the three principles126: reason, judgements and
emotions. In support of their argument, Kirman et al. quote Patricia
Greenspan:
The category of emotions covers a disputed territory, but clear
examples include fear, anger, joy, pride, sadness, disgust, shame,
contempt and the like. Such states are commonly thought of as
antithetical to reason, disorienting and distorting practical thought.
However, there is also a sense in which emotions are factors in
practical reasoning, understood broadly as reasoning that issues in
action. At the very least emotions can function as ‘enabling’ causes of
rational decision-making (despite the many cases in which they are
disabling) insofar as they direct attention toward certain objects of
thought and away from others. They serve to heighten memory and to
limit the set of salient practical options to a manageable set, suitable for
decision-making (Greenspan 2002, p. 206).127
Greenspan’s conception of the emotional-state does not deny that
emotions and their respective actions (based on these emotions) could
contradict each other; and as a result, this contradiction could cause
undesirable outcomes. However, she clarifies that there is no rationale to
imply persistently that emotions could not be useful to reason and to
judgements and vice versa.
Kirman et al. elaborate further by arguing that observing the
performance of emotions and our understanding of them is a complex matter.
Still, in various particular contexts the non-contradiction of reason and

See Kirman, Alan, Livet, Pierre and Teschl, Miriam. 2010. Rationality and Emotions.
Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society. Vol. 365: 215-219.
127 See Kirman et al. 2010, 215.
126
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judgements128 is possible. Past learning experience, for example, could allow
emotions to produce deliberate reasoning and thus actions to institute future
relevant opportunities. Similarly, the social context interactions: they permit a
reciprocal understanding of emotional facial expressions of others (for
instance) and thus this understanding gives our reason a chance to better
understand each other and accordingly judge situations in a reasonable
manner. They assert that “emotions and affective states are not just sources of
biased judgements, but may also serve as essential functions leading to more
appropriate choices” (Kirman et al. 2010, 216-218).
So, we can infer from the above argument that the controversies
between reason, judgements and emotions are critical. But even though, there
are yet possibilities that in particular occasions the emotional-state of the mind
enables the reasoning-state and sound judgements-state; and, in other
particular occasions, the emotional-state of the mind itself is an outcome of
the capacities of reasoning and judgements. Consequently, from this
perspective, deliberating pathos using rhetorical spoken discourse is a
potential asset for the proficient rhētōr. It is a benefit for him to conceive the

Kirman et al. quoting Greenspan: “Contemporary Philosophy of emotion attempts
something stronger, however, in according emotions a role in practical reasoning. Making
this an integral role— understanding emotions as functioning within practical reasoning
rather than just as spurs to it—means interpreting emotions in normative terms, as providing
or expressing potential reasons for action, and as themselves subject to rational assessment
and control, contrary to the traditional view of emotions as ‘passive’ phenomena” (Kirman et
al. 2010, 218).
128
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emotion-process in order to deliberate on emotional-states of the mind using
his tekhnē.
5.3

Significant Emotional-State Behaviors
Feelings, emotions129 and pathos: equivalent terms to indicate reaction

based on stimulated factors or events. The reactions based on emotional-states
could be only intelligible or could be followed by actions. Nevertheless, in
both cases, the state is being processed by the mind of the human being in a
way that engages the relevant reasoning faculty (or state of the mind) and
thus the relevant judgements faculty (or state of the mind).
Based on this conception, the process through which an emotionalstate is being transformed or translated involves – in different proportions –
ethical values, morals, objectives, reciprocity, consciousness and awareness to
the contextual settings of the particular emotional-state. The method,
moreover, does not exclude the social settings130, the religious settings and the
educational settings. Each of these identified components has its own impact
on the emotional-state in the corresponding situation.

Emotions here refer to “emotions specific … with respect to the following features: they are
(i) focused on specific events; (ii) involve the appraisal of intrinsic features of objects or events
as well as their motive consistency and conduciveness to specific motives; (iii) affect most or
all bodily subsystems which may become to some extent synchronized; (iv) are subject to
rapid change owing to the generation of action to the unfolding of events and reappraisals;
and (v) have a strong impact on behavior owing to the generation of action readiness and
control precedence” (Scherer 2009, 3459-3460).
130 Settings refers to the related conditions, factors or circumstances.
129
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Hence, when the emotional-state-interaction is being in persistent
intelligible activeness, it plays a significant role in potentially instituting
behaviors or beliefs of human beings. Scherer in his article Emotions are
emergent processes elaborates four main categories that embody the observed
features of emotions through which we can identify the variant behavioral
emotional-states:
(i) Emotions are elicited when something relevant happens to the
organism, having a direct bearing on its needs … Relevance is
determined by the appraisal of events on a number of criteria, in
particular the novelty or unexpectedness of a stimulus or event, its
intrinsic pleasantness or unpleasantness and its motivational
consistency … (ii) Emotions prepare the organism to deal with
important events in their lives and thus have a strong motivational
force, producing states of action readiness … (iii) Emotions engage the
entire person, urging action and/or imposing action suspension … This
means that emotions involve several components of the organism that
tend to cohere to a certain degree in emotion episodes, sometimes to
the point of becoming highly synchronized … (iv) Emotions bestow
control precedence on those states of action readiness, in the sense of
claiming (not always successfully) priority in the control of behavior
and experience.131
According to Scherer, these four categories correspond to the
cognitive132 theories. They assume the subjective assessment of the human
being regarding any particular stimulating occasion. The cognitive

See Scherer 2009, 3459.
Cognitive theories refer only to (1) the judgments theories and (2) the cognitive appraisal
theories. Both theories indicate that for stimulated-based emotional-states, two factors ought
to be observed: (1) the subjective evaluation of the human being to the particular stimulating
event/occasion, and (2) this particular human being beliefs, ethical values, existing settings,
and desires … among others (Johnson 2015).
131
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judgement133 theory and the cognitive appraisal134 theory allow the stimulated
emotional-state to communicate with the respective faculties of the mind (i.e.
the faculty of reason and the faculty of judgement) to function on a
consequent-based reaction to the particular stimulating event/occasion.
Scherer asserts, “it is only through the specific behavioral meaning of an event
for an individual that the action preparation following the appraisal process
can have adaptive value” (Scherer 2009, 3560-3561).
From the above discussions, we can deduce that the emotion-process is
intricate. However, it accounts for a potential reasonable association between
the states of the mind of: reason, judgement and emotion. And, it is a
subjective process, which enforces an affirmative correlation between the
particular stimulating occasion and the individual’s self-attributes and

Judgement Theory: Johnson elaborates that the judgement theory encompasses the
particular judgement of human being to himself and his existence. It thus assumes that this
mental ability (i.e. judging) includes the human being’s own values, ideals and experiences.
Furthermore, he asserts that all judgement theories “state that judgements are necessary for
an emotion” (Johnson 2015).
134 Cognitive Appraisal Theory: according to Johnson, psychologists have accounted to this
theory. The sole difference between the appraisal theory and the judgement theory is that the
appraisal theory does not count the judgement in the emotion process; however, it offers an
analyzed account of appraisals based on stimulating events/occasions. The theory “has five
appraisal components that can produce 14 discrete emotions. The appraisal components and
the different values that each component can take are motivational state (appetitive,
aversive), situational state (motive-consistent, motive-inconsistent), probability (certain,
uncertain, unknown), power (strong, weak), and agency (self-caused, other-caused,
circumstance-caused). The basic idea is that when a stimulus is encountered it is appraised
along these five dimensions. Each appraisal component is assigned one of its possible values,
and together these values determine which emotion response will be generated” (Johnson
2015).
133
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empirical contexts. It also confirms that the emotional-state of the mind, from
the perspective of the cognitive theories mentioned above, persistently refers
to the faculty of reason and the faculty of judgement in order to postulate the
potential change in meaningful reactions and as a result the potential change
in meaningful actions. Therefore, deliberating about rhetorical spoken
discourses using pathos, in the dimension illustrated herewith, has a practical
and a potential possibility for exerting change on the status-quo of the minds
of its listeners.
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CHAPTER 6 – St. Augustine on Pathos
6.1

Cultural Background
As teacher of rhetoric, a philosopher and a theologian, St. Augustine of

Hippo (354-430 AD) was behind the intellectual shift from the political
rhetoric perspective to the rhetoric of theology during the early years of
Medieval Philosophy. His rhetoric followed three different doctrines: Plato’s,
Aristotle’s and Cicero’s. However, he was affected mostly by Cicero135,
especially his treatise. McKeon elaborates that:
The influence of rhetoric on Augustine was by reaction and
assimilation; he differentiated two eloquences and two arts, much as
Plato had proved rhetoric to be a pseudo art in the Gorgias and yet had
illustrated the method of the true rhetoric based on dialectic in the
Phaedrus. Augustine was first attracted to philosophy by Cicero's
Hortensius which he encountered in the course of his rhetorical studies,
and he was put off in his further attempt to combine philosophy with
the name of Christ by the contrast of the Scriptural and Ciceronian
style.136
Augustine adapted his rhetorical doctrine to Cicero’s, where Cicero’s
chief political perspective was transformed wholly into the theological
perspective of Augustine. McKeon explains that Augustine divided his

McKeon in his article Rhetoric in the Middle Ages describes the rhetoric of Cicero as “moral
and political in its applications, and the influence of rhetoric extended to political doctrine.
The differentiation of things according to ends loved and means used had already entered
Christiane ethics in Ambrose's De Officiis Ministrorum which was based on the distinctions of
Cicero's De Officiis and Cicero's rhetorically conceived political theory supplies, by virtue of
the same distinction the terminology for Augustine's discussion of the city of God as well as
the elements of the terrestrial city to which it is contrasted” (McKeon 1942, 7).
136 See McKeon 1942, 5.
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rhetorical doctrine into two groups of fundamental inquiries: (1) basic
inquiries137, and (2) Scriptural inquiries138. The two sets of inquiries
corresponded to: “on things” and “on signs”. On Christian Doctrine, as a
result, is St. Augustine’s Scriptural method of discovery to establish “what
should be understood” and “what has been understood” when it comes to the
conceptions of Scriptural text (McKeon 1942, 3-8).
6.2

Eloquence and Emotions
Deliberating pathos in St. Augustine’s rhetorical discourse is significant.

The means through which he recognized an unceasing association between
emotions and the teachings of the Scriptural texts is evident throughout On
Christian Doctrine. His communicative illustration of using eloquence and
conventional signs in transforming political rhetoric into theological rhetoric is
embodied within his preaching guidelines/methods along with the notions of:
wisdom, truth and sustaining an emotional-state with listeners in order to
attain persuasion. Hence, the literature in this section will elaborate St.
Augustine’s deliberation on pathos within his framework of the eloquence of
preaching a knowledgeable spoken discourse.

McKeon argues that Augustine’s basic inquiries persistently resorted to “Cicero’s three
'constitution of causes' – whether a thing is, what it is, and what sort” (McKeon 1942, 5).
138 McKeon argues that Augustine’s Scriptural inquiries, as well, persistently resorted to
Cicero’s “two of Cicero's five parts of rhetoric - discovery and statement” (McKeon 1942, 6).
137
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Augustine’s Scriptural eloquence:
There are also certain rules for a more copious kind of argument,
which is called eloquence … they can be used to enforce the truth …
the expression of affection conciliates the hearer … a narrative, when it
is short and clear, is effective, and that variety arrests men's attention
without wearying them. And it is the same with other directions of the
same kind, which … are themselves true just in so far as they are
effective in producing knowledge or belief, or in moving men's minds
to desire and aversion.139
Eloquence was already present in non-religious texts; however,
Augustine’s intentions in amplifying the usage of different forms of
conventional signs in order to convey the meanings of the Scriptural text
eloquently are for practical guidelines of teaching140.
Biblical texts, according to Augustine, are perceived by many as
complicated141 texts. Their ambiguities – sometimes – make the overall
understanding quite difficult; hence, the process of understanding biblical
texts becomes either incomplete or incorrect. Therefore, a proficient preacher

See On Christian Doctrine Book II, Chapter 36.
Teaching: Augustine elaborates further on the attributes or qualities of who should teach
and interpret Scriptural texts. He explains that “if a man fully understands that "the end of
the commandment is charity, out of a pure heart, and of a good conscience, and of faith
unfeigned," and is bent upon making all his understanding of Scripture to bear upon these
three graces, he may come to the interpretation of these books with an easy mind. For while
the apostle says "love," he adds "out of a pure heart," to provide against anything being loved
but that which is worthy of love. And he joins with this "a good conscience," in reference to
hope … by living uprightly we are able to indulge the hope that our hope shall not be in
vain” (On Christian Doctrine Book I, Chap. 39-40).
141 Complicated here refers to the metaphors and the conventional signs presented in Biblical
texts. Understanding the meaning behind their usage, in the contexts they are used in, is quite
complicated for standard readers. Augustine asserts that “there are two causes which prevent
what is written from being understood: its being veiled either under unknown, or under
ambiguous signs” (On Christian Doctrine Book II, Chapter 10).
139
140
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ought to rely on simplicity and pleasantness in approaching his listeners (i.e.
using eloquence), particularly when he is seeking persuasion.
Augustine argues that conventional signs and any relevant eloquence
tools do not alter the meaning behind the actual Script-texts. On the contrary,
eloquence in interpreting the Scriptural discourses affects the listeners’ minds
more efficiently when it is equipped with both: knowledge, simplicity, and
enthusiasm. The listeners not only listen with attentiveness, but also with joy.
6.3

Conventional Signs and Emotions
Augustine’s Scriptural Signs:
When I come to discuss the subject of signs142 … not to attend to what
they are in themselves, but to the fact that they are signs, that is, to
what they signify. For a sign is a thing which, over and above the
impression it makes on the senses, causes something else to come into
the mind as a consequence of itself: … when we see smoke, we know
that there is fire beneath; and when we hear the voice of a living man,
we think of the feeling in his mind; and when the trumpet sounds,
soldiers know that they are to advance or retreat, or do whatever else
the state of the battle requires.143
Before Augustine can initiate his rhetorical theory of eloquence and

conventional signs, he first has to explain what signs are and how to
differentiate between natural and conventional signs. He elaborates that when
we perceive things, sometimes our minds senses or renders them in terms of
our prior-experience of them. The form in which the mind comprehends the

142
143

Signs: are of two classes, (1) natural signs; and, (2) conventional signs.
See On Christian Doctrine Book II, Chapter 1.
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thing is based on the implications it denotes and not the material thing in itself
or its essence.
In this sense, natural signs are the things that do not need or do not bear
any other intentions when we perceive them. Furthermore, they are the things
that do not convey or contain any knowledge by themselves. The natural
signs are irrelevant to the context of the Scriptural understanding and
persuasion for Augustine. For what he is seeking is another class of signs that
do imply within their perception thorough and valuable intensions.
Augustine’s Scriptural Conventional Signs:
Conventional signs, on the other hand, are those which living beings
mutually exchange for the purpose of showing, as well as they can, the
feelings of their minds, or their perceptions, or their thoughts. Nor is
there any reason for giving a sign except the desire of drawing forth
and conveying into another's mind what the giver of the sign has in his
own mind … because even the signs which have been given us of God,
and which are contained in the Holy Scriptures, were made known to
us through men—those, namely, who wrote the Scriptures.144
The purpose of Augustine’s rhetorical intervention is to teach, explain,
please and persuade the listeners with the wisdom and values of the
Scriptural texts. Therefore, the plain/natural signs that contain no knowledge
in them other than the thing perceived per se are not related to his objective. It
is the conventional signs that embody within their intensions and
implications the genuine means that persuade us with the truth. As

144

See On Christian Doctrine Book II, Chapter 2.
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Augustine argues, the conventional signs are the ones that need the teaching.
For they are the ones presented to us in the Scriptural texts; and, by
understanding them, our emotional state of the mind conceives the real
meanings and values – i.e. wisdom and truth.
6.4

Theory of Arrangement, Style and Delivery: St. Augustine’s

Development of Pathos
It is the duty, then, of the interpreter and teacher of Holy Scripture, the
defender of the true faith and the opponent of error, both to teach what
is right and to refute what is wrong, and in the performance of this task
to conciliate the hostile, to rouse the careless, and to tell the ignorant
both what is occurring at present and what is probable in the future.
But once that his hearers are friendly, attentive, and ready to learn,
whether he has found them so, or has himself made them so, the
remaining objects are to be carried out in whatever way the case
requires. If the hearers need teaching, the matter treated of must be
made fully known by means of narrative. On the other hand, to clear
up points that are doubtful requires reasoning and the exhibition of
proofs. If, however, the hearers require to be roused rather than
instructed, in order that they may be diligent to do what they already
know, and to bring their feelings into harmony with the truths they
admit, greater vigour of speech is needed. Here entreaties and
reproaches, exhortations and upbraidings, and all the other means of
rousing the emotions, are necessary.145
St. Augustine’s On Christian Doctrine establishes a decisive method for
persuading the listeners with wisdom and truth. In doing so, Augustine sets
up a road map for any wise146 teacher to follow. Moreover, none of his criteria

See On Christian Doctrine Book IV, Chapter 4.
Augustine’s conception of wisdom necessitate Scriptural knowledge; he explains, “the man
who is bound to speak wisely, even though he cannot speak eloquently, to retain in memory
the words of Scripture” (On Christian Doctrine Book IV, Chap. 5).
145
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excluded deliberation on emotion. His theory147 for attaining the purpose of
teaching the Scriptural text includes a hierarchal arrangement of the speech;
each of the steps is to be accompanied simultaneously by an inspirational
style and a meaningful argument for delivery. In other words, the eloquent
teaching of Scriptural texts implies concurrently using the appropriate style of
approaching the listeners and at the same time embodying meaningful
conventional signs to facilitate the conceptions of the texts and remove any
ambiguities.

St. Augustine elaborates on his theory by stating that: “a great orator has truly said that "an
eloquent man must speak so as to teach, to delight, and to persuade." Then he adds. "To teach
is a necessity, to delight is a beauty, to persuade is a triumph." Now of these three, the one
first mentioned, the teaching, which is a matter of necessity, depends on what we say; the
other two on the way we say it. He, then, who speaks with the purpose of teaching should not
suppose that he has said what he has to say as long as he is not understood; for although
what he has said be intelligible to himself, it is not said at all to the man who does not
understand it. If, however, he is understood, he has said his say, whatever may have been his
manner of saying it. But if he wishes to delight or persuade his hearer as well, he will not
accomplish that end by putting his thought in any shape no matter what, but for that purpose
the style of speaking is a matter of importance. And as the hearer must be pleased in order to
secure his attention, so he must be persuaded in order to move him to action. And as he is
pleased if you speak with sweetness and elegance, so he is persuaded if he be drawn by your
promises, and awed by your threats; If he reject what you condemn, and embrace what you
commend; if he grieve when you heap up objects for grief, and rejoice when you point out an
object for joy; if he pity those whom you present to him as objects of pity, and shrink from
those whom you set before him as men to be feared and shunned. I need not go over all the
other things that can be done by powerful eloquence to move the minds of the hearers, not
telling them what they ought to do, but urging them to do what they already know ought to
be done” (On Christian Doctrine Book IV, Chap. 12).
147
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CHAPTER 7 – George Campbell on Pathos
7.1

Cultural Background
George Campbell (1719-1796), a lecturer of religion, a preacher and a

college principal, was one of the prominent Enlightenment philosophers.
During the eighteenth century in Europe, generally, then in Britain
particularly, questions about religious ideologies and beliefs were prevalent.
Thus, it was found necessary to re-inforce reason.
Campbell’s theory established a conception to communicate the
rhetorical discourse directly to the rational faculty of the human mind. Hence,
his theory was the attempt to respond to the religious problems (i.e.
ideologies and beliefs). The objective of his theory was to convey the
discourse to the human mind using reason in order to pursue a potential
change in their emotional-state.
In Campbell’s book, The Philosophy of Rhetoric, the impact of Sir Bacon’s
theories of the mind and their connection to psychology is evident throughout
his literature. Herrick explains that:
Campbell advanced a scientific rhetoric, but science for him meant
something like what philosophy means today: an organized and a
rational account of a subject … His rhetoric, then, reflects what were
taken to be advances in the fields such as ethics and psychology …
Through new discoveries, Campbell sought to understand how the
human mind operates and to provide instruction in eloquence based
on the understanding. Guided by Bacon … Enlightenment writers
tended to divide up the mind into two different capacities or faculties.
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In the faculty psychology view, the mind consisted of the
understanding, the imaginations, the passions and the will … For
Campbell, each mental faculty spoke virtually its own language. The
understanding spoke the language of logic, while the passion spoke the
language of emotion … The understanding was informed, and when
satisfied responded with conviction. The imagination perceived
beauty. The passions and will moved one toward direction.148
Thus, the sections to follow will attempt to demonstrate Campbell’s
rhetorical theory. The theory is expressively articulated to address149 the
psychological faculty of the human mind for deliberating emotional appeals by
the means of rhetorical reasoning150. In addition, the objective of the theory is
to potentially produce action.
7.2

Reason and Emotions
Campbell’s rhetorical theory encompasses a concurrent presence of

reason and emotions; however, this reciprocal connection has boundaries 151
and limitations.

See Herrick 2001, 170-180.
Herrick claims that for Campbell “persuasion was a matter of addressing both the
emotions and the reason, as people are not convinced without arguments and do not act
except in response to emotions. “When persuasion is the end, passion [emotion] must be
engaged,” he writes. Campbell explains the relationship between emotions and reason this
way: “the former is affected by communicating lively and glowing ideas of the object, the
latter … by presenting the best and most forcible arguments which the natures of the subject
admits”” (Herrick 2001, 181).
150 Campbell explains the necessity of reason and emotions simultaneously for persuasion by
asserting that: “Would we not only touch the heart, but win it entirely to co-operate with our
views, those affecting lineaments must be so interwoven with our argument, as that, from the
passion excited, our reasoning may derive importance, and so be fitted for commanding
attention; and by the justness of the reasoning, the passion may be more deeply rooted and
enforced; and that thus both may be made to conspire in effectuating that persuasion which is
the end proposed” (Campbell 1868, 28).
151 Boundaries and limitations refer to pointing out that his concept was to move from a
widely spread religious misinterpretations or misunderstanding to a rational understanding
148
149
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Campbell occupied the position of a preacher; and, as such, he was
trying to seek limitations to Biblical texts interpretations. These limitations
should allow the Enlightenment movement objective (of prevailing
rationality) on a long-term basis. His argument regarding these boundaries
were chiefly based on the idea that Biblical texts are facts; thus, they neither
need persuasion nor need assertions. Accordingly, Campbell established a
few limitations for those who preach and teach religions. He explains:
But an apostle or evangelist (for there is no anachronism in a bare
supposition) might have thus addressed the celebrated Athenian: "You
do, indeed, succeed to admiration, and the address and genius which
you display in speaking justly entitle you to our praise. But, however
great the consequences may be of the measures to which, by your
eloquence, they are determined, the change produced in the people is
nothing, or next to nothing. If you would be ascertained of the truth of
this, allow the assembly to disperse immediately after hearing you ;
give them time to cool, and then collect their votes, and it is a thousand
to one you shall find that the charm is dissolved. But very different is
the purpose of the Christian orator. It is not a momentary, but a
permanent effect at which he aims. It is not an immediate and
favourable suffrage, but a thorough change of heart and disposition
that will satisfy his view. That man would need to be possessed of
oratory superior to human who would effectually persuade him that
stole to steal no more, the sensualist to forego his pleasures, and the
miser his hoards, the insolent and haughty to become meek and
humble, the vindictive forgiving, the cruel and unfeeling merciful and
humane.152

that allow a systematic interaction between the different faculties of the mind, namely: reason
and emotions. This implies that there should be boundaries set to rigid preaching methods.
152 See Campbell 1868, 130-131.
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Campbell does not exclude eloquence from preaching. On the other
hand, if Biblical texts are in themselves factual, particularly for the listeners
who attend the Church congregations, then why does an orator need to
establish an emotional state with his listeners if he is not seeking persuasion?
He asserts that Biblical texts include the best forms of speech and
explanations153, how then could a human orator compete with the sacred text
and try to become more convincing? Even if the orator tries to do this, his
effect will be momentary and non-worthy.
On the other side, when it comes to subjects that need convincing and
persuasion, rhetorical skills are necessary. Engaging the listeners through
various means in order to reach the state of understanding is allowed; and,
arousing their faculty of emotions would be of value to convince their faculty
of reason. For these particular occasions, the faculty of reason and the faculty
of emotions are of the same relevance and should not cancel each other.
Campbell elaborates this by claiming that:

Campbell elaborated further by saying: “I remember to have seen it somewhere remarked,
that mankind being necessarily incapable of making a present of anything to God, have
conceived, as a succedaneous expedient, the notion of destroying what should be offered to
him, or, at least, of rendering it unfit for any purpose. Something similar appears to have
taken place in regard to the explanation of the Divine nature and attributes attempted by
some theorists. On a subject so transcendent, if it be impossible to be sublime, it is easy to be
unintelligible. And that the theme is naturally incomprehensible, they seem to have
considered as a full apology for them in being perfectly absurd. In the former case, what
people could not in strictness bestow upon their Maker, they could easily render unfit for the
stow of men; and in the latter, if one cannot grasp what is above the reach of reason, one can
without difficulty say a thousand things which are contrary to reason” (Campbell 1868, 273274).
153
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A person present with us, whom we see and hear, and who, by words,
and looks, and gestures, gives the liveliest signs of his feelings, has the
surest and most immediate claim upon our sympathy … We are
hurried along by them, and not allowed leisure to distinguish between
his relation and our relation, his interest and our interest. So much for
those circumstances in the object presented by the speaker which serve
to awaken and inflame the passions of the hearers. But when a passion
is once raised there are also other means by which it may be kept alive,
and even augmented … Nothing is more efficacious in this respect than
a sense of justice, a sense of public utility, a sense of glory; and nothing
conduceth more to operate on these than the sentiments of sages whose
wisdom we venerate, the example of heroes whose exploits we admire.
I shall conclude what relates to the exciting of passion when I have
remarked that pleading the importance and the other pathetic
circumstances, or pleading the authority of opinions or precedents, is
usually considered, and aptly enough, as being likewise a species of
reasoning.154
Campbell’s description of the need of the simultaneous connection
between reason and emotions for the sake of convincing and persuading
(which are the objectives of the rhetorical discourse) asserts that an appeal to
emotions leads concurrently to an appeal to reason. As a result, he establishes
his theory of invention and presentation in rhetoric to reach persuasion.
7.3

Theory of Invention and Presentation: Campbell’s Development of

pathos
Campbell argues that in order for an orator to attain the purpose of his
rhetorical speech, he should empower his speech by using inventions and

154

See Campbell 1868, 112-114.
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presentations155. His invention theory (using loci156) aims to persuade the
faculty of reason – by assuring the senses; and his presentation theory (using
auditors and descriptive language)157 aims at persuading the faculty of
emotion – by arousing passion. When these theories are applied in their right
order through implied arrangement158 in speech, they act on the faculty of
memory and the faculty of imagination respectively. The steps resemble a
series of recalled incidents and places (for memory)159 and demonstrated

“It was observed of memory, that as it instantly succeeds sensation, it is the repository of
all the stores from which our experience is collected, and that without an implicit faith in the
clear representations of that faculty, we could not advance a step in the acquisition of
experimental knowledge … it is a proof consisting of an uninterrupted series of axioms. The
truth of each is intuitively perceived as we proceed. But this process is of necessity gradual,
and these axioms are all brought in succession. It must, then, be solely by the aid of memory
that they are capable of producing conviction in the mind. Nor by this do I mean to affirm
that we can remember the preceding steps, with their connections, so as to have them all
present to our view at one instant; for then we should, in that instant, perceive the whole
intuitively. Our remembrance, on the contrary, amounts to no more than this, that the
perception of the truth of the axiom to which we have advanced in the proof, is accompanied
with a strong impression on the memory of the- satisfaction that the mind received from the
justness and regularity of what preceded. And in this we are under a necessity of acquiescing;
for the understanding is no more capable of contemplating and perceiving, at once, the truth
of all the propositions in the series, than the tongue is capable of uttering them at once”
(Campbell 1868, 80-81).
156 Loci refers to places; the concept of loci allows the orator to enhance his speech with
evidences using the faculty of memory in his listeners.
157 Campbell explains: “This, I believe, it will be acknowledged to do principally, if not solely
… by communicating lively, distinct, and strong ideas of the distress which it exhibits. By a
judicious yet natural arrangement of the most affecting circumstances, by a proper selection
of the most suitable tropes and figures, it enlivens the ideas raised in the imagination”
(Campbell 1868, 141-142).
158 Arrangement: it is required in establishing and confirming the data processes by both
memory and imagination. These confirmations acts as evidences that facilitates the
persuasion of the faculty of emotion and the faculty of reason.
159 The memory evidences assure the faculty of reason; thus, it allows it to be persuaded.
Campbell asserts, “sense operates more strongly on the mind than imagination does”
(Campbell 1868, 142).
155
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images and ideas (for imagination)160 that come together in the mind in order
to allow the listener to reach the state of being convinced by the evidences.
Convincing the will results in persuasion for action and attaining this purpose
could not happen unless a speech employs an arrangement to affect reason
and emotions simultaneously161.
Therefore, for Campbell “all the ends of speaking are reducible to four;
every speech is intended to enlighten the understanding, to please the
imagination, to move the passions, or to influence the will” (Campbell 1868,
23).

The imagination evidences assure the faculty of emotion; thus, it allows it to be persuaded.
Campbell argues, “it is this power of which the orator must chiefly avail himself, it is proper
to inquire what these circumstances are which will make the ideas he summons up in the
imaginations of his hearers resemble, in lustre and steadiness, those of sensation and
remembrance; for the same circumstances will infallibly make them resemble also in their
effects; that is, in the influence they will have upon the passions and affections of the heart”
(Campbell 1868, 103).
161 According to Campbell, “there is an attraction or association among the passions … and
the mind. Rarely any passion comes alone” (Campbell 1868, 152).
160
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CHAPTER 8 – Chaïm Perelman on Pathos
8.1

Cultural Background
Chaïm Perelman (1912-1984), a lecturer of history with resilient

understanding of law and the role of logic and rhetoric in legal arbitrations,
initiated a rhetorical shift in Contemporary Philosophy. His awareness of the
need of allowing argumentation to meet the practical and the actual state of
existence of human beings made him insist on forming a theory of rhetoric
that enables reason and emotions to reconcile. Perelman’s The New Rhetoric: A
Treatise on Argumentation exemplifies his conception of a sincere adaptation to
the requirements of this reality.
Long and Jarvis describe Perelman’s contemporary reformation of the
rhetorical argumentation by stating that:
"Language: Pragmatic and Dialogic" "Logic or Rhetoric," "Philosophy and
Argumentation/The Philosophy of Argumentation," and "Theories of
Knowledge", each essay illuminates the ethos behind the man who
developed the theoretical system of argumentation that helped to
foster the current renaissance of rhetoric. The ethos of Perelman,
permeating these essays, places the theoretical system, which he
delineated in The New Rhetoric: A Treatise on Argumentation and
elsewhere, back into the context from which it was derived: the context
of rich, human interaction … returns to terms that American readers,
familiar with An Historical Introduction to Philosophical Thinking, The
New Rhetoric: A Treatise on Argumentation, and The Realm of Rhetoric,
have come to associate with Perelman's work--terms such as double
hierarchy, notions, dissociation, and analogy. Perelman s offers
relevant insights and useful tools for furthering connections among
various bodies of knowledge.162
162

See Long and Jarvis 1990, 87-89.
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According to the explanation provided by Long and Jarvis, Perelman is
behind the call for being “reasonable” – in the sense that it is indeed
appropriate for value systems, structures and notions; however, it is as well
our responsibility to redirect our intellectual deliberations to run parallel to
the present-state of societies and cultures.
Before we move on to Perelman’s conceptions of rhetoric, we need to
be vigilant to the regressive163 order of his discussion. Though the
demonstration sequence that he uses, in my opinion, sharpens the level of
philosophical argumentation, unless the presentation of his theory in this
research follows a systematic order, the understanding of his conceptions
could err and lead to various controversies.
8.2

The Communion, Reason and Emotions
Perelman defines the objective of argumentation164 by stating, “all

argumentation aims at gaining the adherence of the minds, and, by this very

The regressive order, in my opinion, is due to his wide selection of argumentation theories
and concepts to arouse attentiveness to the debate; to me, it projected an outcome of being
persuaded by his theory; however, it might not be the case with other readers of his literature.
Therefore, the following sections will be discussed in their logical sequence rather than the
route that Perelman used in his argumentation – for the sake of coherence and clarity of this
research.
164 Argumentation, according to Perelman, is the means for realizing rationalization. He
explains that: “those who do not see, or will not allow, the importance of argumentation
cannot account for rationalization: for them it would be merely the shadow of a shadow” (The
New Rhetoric: A Treatise on Argumentation 1969, 42).
163
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fact, assumes the existence of an intellectual contact”165. His assertion implies
that reason is his means to seek persuasion (i.e. when the minds of his
audience adhere to the argumentation); this implies that reason is involved in
any form of argumentation; however, this same “mind adherence166” could
not be attained unless there is a reciprocal intellectual connection between the
orator and his audience167.
How then can an orator establish the intellectual connection with his
audience? Perelman replies to this inquiry by stating that:
Unlike the demonstration of a geometrical theorem, which established
once and for all a logical connection between speculative168 truths, the
argumentation in epidictic discourse sets out to increase the intensity
of adherence to certain values, which might not be contested when
considered on their own but may nevertheless not prevail against other
values that might come into conflict with them. The speaker tries to
establish a sense of communion centered around particular values
recognized by the audience, and to this end he uses the whole range of

See The New Rhetoric: A Treatise on Argumentation 1969, 14.
Mind adherence, according to Perelman, denotes: “adherence of the minds is its variable
intensity: nothing constraints us to limit our study to a particular degree of adherence
characterized by self-evidence, and nothing permits us to consider a priori the degrees of
adherence to a thesis as proportional to its probability and to identify self-evidence with
truth” (The New Rhetoric: A Treatise on Argumentation 1969, 4).
167 Perelman divides the audience – who enjoys the rhetorical argumentation and
communicate with it – to three genres: (1) “the whole of mankind … we shall refer to it as
universal audience”; (2) “the single interlocutor whom a speaker addresses in a dialogue”; and,
(3) the subject himself when he deliberates or gives himself reasons for his actions” (The New
Rhetoric: A Treatise on Argumentation 1969, 30).
168 Perelman explains that when “self-evident” or “speculative truths” are demonstrated “the
adherence of the mind seems to be suspended to a compelling truth, and no role is played by
the processes of argumentation. The individual, with his freedom of deliberation and of
choice, defers to the constraining force of reason, which takes from him all possibility of
doubt” (The New Rhetoric: A Treatise on Argumentation 1969, 32).
165
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means available to the rhetorician for purposes of amplification and
enhancement.169
The above quote implies that when the rhetor is seeking a discourse to
adhere to the minds of the listeners, he should establish a state of unity
among them (based on a common or shared concept between both sides). In
other words, the rhetor ought to deliberate on the means through which the
listeners and the rhetor associate with each other. The objective of establishing
this communion170 is to “secure”171 a shared understanding between both
parties of the discourse in order to move forward with the argument.
We can thus deduce from the above that Perelman’s conception of
argumentation embodies communicating with the faculty of reason of
audience. And, in order to attain this state, a sustainable emotional
engagement between the rhetor and the audience is necessary. Furthermore,
the two-sided engagement or connection could not be established except in

See The New Rhetoric: A Treatise on Argumentation 169 1969, 51. ** The New Rhetoric: A Treatise
on Argumentation will be referred to till the end of this research as TNR.
170 An example of establishing social communion – using shared forms of values or agreed
upon maxims (they are expressed by language) – as argued by Perelman: “Slogans and
catchwords are maxims developed to meet the requirements of a specific action. They are
designed to secure attention through their rhythm and their concise and easily remembered
form, but they are adapted to particular circumstances, require constant renewal … They may
be able to stimulate action … their function is essentially that of compelling our attention to
certain ideas, by means of the form in which they are expressed” (TNR 1969, 167).
171 “Securing an agreement on … certain points is hence an objective which will determine the
order to be followed in argumentation. A speech is not exclusively built up by developing the
original premises; it consists also of establishing premises and of making agreements
unambiguous and stable … These agreements sometimes are the result of the attitude of the
parties, and sometimes they are institutionalized by virtue of established custom or the
existence of explicit rules of procedure” (TNR 1969, 110).
169
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language expressions and forms that illustrate values, beliefs and social
norms among other form of communion. Hence, according to Perelman, both
reason and emotion are necessary for attaining the objective of rhetorical
argumentation (i.e. for attaining persuasion). Communion, then, is the center
or the conductor of the process of association.
8.3

Theory of Amplification: Perelman’s Development of pathos
According to Perelman, values amplify the emotional state of the

listeners and therefore intensify communion. Values are expressed in the
discourse in two forms: (1) as particular values, and, (2) as abstract values.
Each of the two forms has its distinct impact on the listeners; however, both –
when expressed appropriately – allow the emotional state of the listeners to
luring about the potential change intended172 by the rhetorical argument.
Perelman elaborates the concept of using values by stating that:
Besides facts, truths, and presumptions, characterized by the
agreement of the universal173 audience, our classification scheme must
also find a place for the objects of agreement in regard to which only
the adherence of the particular groups is claimed. The objects are the
values hierarchies, and the loci of the preferable. Agreement with
The intended potential change refers to persuasion, which implies the potentiality of taking
action.
173 The highest state of amplification happens when the agreement is between the rhetor and
the universal audience. Perelman defines the universal audience as “this refers … not to an
experimentally proven fact, but to a universality and unanimity imagined by the speaker, to
the agreement of an audience which should be universal, since for legitimate reasons, we
need not take into consideration those which are not part of it …Everyone constitutes the
universal audience from what he knows of his fellow men, in such a way as to transcend the
few oppositions he is aware of. Each individual, each culture, has thus its own conception of
universal audience” (TNR 1969, 31-33).
172
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regard to value means an admission that an object, a being, or an ideal
must have a specific influence on action and disposition toward action
and that one can make use of this influence in an argument, although
the point of view represented is not regarded as binding by everybody.
The existence of values, as objects of agreement that make possible a
communion with regard to particular ways of acting, is connected with
the idea of multiplicity of groups … One appeals to values in order to
induce the hearer to make certain choices rather than the others and,
most of all, to justify those choices so that they may be accepted and
approved by others.174
We can infer from the above that the concept of universal audience is –
in reality – an invention of the rhetor. The objective of this invention is to have
an abstract understanding of the values, beliefs and ideas that connect with
the majority of the audience. This is not to seek the agreement of the entire
audience, but – at least – to consent to a higher probability of agreement.
Therefore, the rhetor can embody in his speech a communion by values based
on a characterization that is appropriate to the universality175 of them; hence,
the values that apply to the universals apply to the particulars of the same
class.
In order to elaborate the amplification theory further, we need to
realize another attribute of the concept of universal audience. Perelman

See TNR 1969, 74-75.
This same concept has been discussed in section 4.3 in this research. It is an Aristotelian
concept, which argues that the form of reasoning (in case of necessities and probabilities) that
applies on categorical subjects (i.e. universals) applies as well on their derived subjects (i.e.
particulars).
174
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argues that the universal audience “pass judgment”176. In other words, the
universal audience appeals to reason (i.e. it validates concepts) and a
particular audience appeals to emotions.
That much said – how does the amplification theory administer the
association177 between values and audience in order to attain its objective?
Perelman elaborates that a rhetor can use both forms of values during the
speech, each in its own place. He argues that particular values amplify
abstract emotional states. For instance, the flag of a particular country: it is a
particular object; it denotes a certain value for the universal audience of this
particular country; as a result, this particular value when employed for the
particular audience, amplifies their emotional sense of behavior towards their
country.
On the other hand, abstract178 values amplify concrete states of
emotion. For example, in a religious congregation, when a Priest (located in
the northern part of any particular country) refers in his discourse to a

Perelman argues, “audiences are not independent of one another, that particular concrete
audiences are capable of validating a concept of the universal audience which characterizes
them … it is the undefined universal audience that is invoked to pass judgement on what is
the concept of universal audience appropriate to such a concrete audience, to examine
simultaneously the manner in which it was composed, which are the individuals who
comprise it, according to the adopted criterion, and whether this criterion is legitimate. It can
be said that audiences pass judgement on one another” (TNR 1969, 35).
177 According to Perelman: "knowledge of an audience cannot be conceived independently of
the knowledge of how to influence it" (TNR 1969, 23).
178 Abstracts is equivalent in this sense to unique; thus, abstract values refers to unique values.
176
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Madonna statue (located in the southern part of this same country); this
abstract religious value amplifies the state of emotion of faith and loyalty
(TNR 1969, 75-79).
A skillful rhētōr is therefore the one who utilizes communion
appropriately in order to reach the state of shared agreement with his
listeners. Perelman’s reasonable theory thus provides us with a better
conception of argumentation involving persuasion.
Perelman eloquently summarizes his approach to argumentation by
stating:
Only the existence of an argumentation that is neither compelling nor
arbitrary can give meaning to human freedom, a state in which a
reasonable choice can be exercised. If freedom has no more than
adherence to a previously given natural order, it would exclude all
possibility of choice; and if the exercise of freedom were not based on
reasons, every choice would be irrational and would be reduced to an
arbitrary decision operating in an intellectual void.179

179

See The New Rhetoric: A Treatise on Argumentation 1969, 514.
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CHAPTER 9 – Conclusion
The tekhnē of spoken discourse is a critical tool for particular
communications and is a substantial means to transform good knowledge180. It is
an objective tekhnē with an ergon, which is man-made. As such, it may be
implemented for political, religious, social or educational purposes.
Thus, understanding the implications of spoken discourse and
establishing a shared understanding between the rhētōr and his listeners is not
just an option in this context. On the contrary, both elements are the
mind/soul/heart of the discourse. For what is the value of a discourse if its
implications and representations are not well perceived by its listeners? Why
do we care to convey knowledge of the good, if we cannot construct an
intellectual connection between the listeners and us? I believe it would be
impossible to attain any tangible outcomes from such an experience without
initiating a discourse that contains these two elements.
On the other hand, these two elements involve two concurrent
prerequisites, which are: (1) the knowledge of the good, and (2) the good
knowledge of the tekhnē. Consequently, converting the knowledge of the good
using the good knowledge of the tekhnē are other central elements of the spoken
discourse. Any rhētōr must exert all possible efforts to craft his argument

Good knowledge here refers to particular good knowledge (i.e. not universal knowledge).
The concept is discussed and argued in chapters 3 and 4 of this research.
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using a reasonable form of rhetorical reasoning. Any proficient rhētōr can convey
his particular knowledge to his listeners through this exclusive medium. His
acquisition of the three skills181, namely: (1) ēthos, (2) logos, and (3) pathos, are
his means to reach the minds of his listeners in their various states.
Furthermore, probability in rhetorical reasoning is not at all an enemy
to strict logic. It also does not deconstruct universality. The natural capability
of the human mind to use common opinions or common sense to perceive
and infer the self-evident is not against logic, reason, knowledge and truth.
Chaïm Perelman explains this further by affirming that:
It is the idea of self-evidence as characteristic of reason, which we must
assail, if we are to make place for a theory of argumentation that will
acknowledge the use of reason in directing our own actions and
influencing those of others. Self-evidence is conceived both as a force to
which every normal mind must yield and as a sign of the truth of that
which imposes itself because it is self-evident. The self-evident would
connect the psychological with the logical and allow passage back and
forth between these two levels. All proof would be reduction to the
self-evident and what is self-evident would have no need of proof.182
Correspondingly, intensifying the emotional states of the mind – pathos
– using rhetorical spoken discourse has its power; and it is reasonable too.
Our faculties of the mind are our means to rationally cognize the cultural
environment we exist in – including the emotion states that we experience.

Explanations in addition to examples to assert the importance of each of the three skills are
provided in Section 4.4 in this research.
182 See The New Rhetoric: A Treatise of Argumentation 1969, 3-4.
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Moreover, according to several recently developed theories183 of the faculties
of the mind, there is an intelligible connection between the faculty of reason,
the faculty of judgement and the faculty of emotions. The meaningful
emotional behaviors184 and their potential institution of beliefs and actions are
quite remarkable. The exemplary developments presented earlier in this
research through a theological perspective185, a rational perspective186, and a
social perspective187 assert and amplify the important role of pathos for
exerting a potential change in the status-quo of the listeners by means of
reason.
Finally, it is apparent from the discussed reflections on the first and the
second objectives of this thesis that a knowledgeable spoken discourse cannot
afford to delete the emotional appeal – pathos – from its situational
circumstances. Although reason and emotional appeal appear to be mutually
exclusive, they support each other. The emotional appeal addresses the
human mind in its particular states. In addition, the emotional appeal is one
of the critical tools to potentially motivate both: change and action through any
objective rhetorical spoken discourse.

The selected theories are discussed in Chapter 5 in this research.
Behaviors here refers to beliefs or actions that are formed based on emotional states; these
emotional states are a result or an outcome of an agreeing state between the faculty of reason
and the faculty of judgement.
185 St. Augustine’s conception of developing pathos.
186 George Campbell’s conception of developing pathos.
187 Chaïm Perelman’s conception of developing pathos.
183
184
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